Researchers at USENIX Security presented a Solana Proof-of-History clock attack on August 12, 2025, a flaw that had been disclosed privately to Solana developers in December 2025. The 50,000 SOL Alpenglow competition ended on August 19, 2025, and its rules omitted behavior that is only reachable when the legacy Proof-of-History consensus was inactive. The paper explains that a scheduled leader can withhold a protocol-valid block, allowing honest validators to advance their logical time, and then release the block anchored to an earlier point in the clock, a process termed re-anchoring. This can create a fork that may orphan an honest leader's block. The attack combines Time Inflation and Fork-Assisted Time Inflation, which merge the re-anchoring with TowerBFT fork-choice logic. Experiments were conducted on a local testnet and through simulations; the authors did not observe a live exploit or mainnet manipulation. Analysis of public mainnet data identified validators with longer timestamp intervals and higher inclusion rates, a pattern consistent with Time Inflation incentives, but no significant increase in skip rates that would indicate Fork-Assisted Time Inflation. The competition excluded this vector because it required the inactive legacy consensus components that Alpenglow intends to replace. Alpenglow's design removes the Proof-of-History re-anchoring and TowerBFT fork-choice prerequisites used in the attack. The Solana development team responded within one day of the December 2025 disclosure, indicating the behavior was known internally and that a future upgrade such as Alpenglow was expected to address it. Activation of Alpenglow is planned for Agave 4.3, after which the specific attack path would become unreachable, leaving the transition as an open issue. The study presents a protocol-valid fairness and latency concern that has not been demonstrated in live use, and the contest's scope leaves the matter unresolved until the planned consensus upgrade takes effect.