Solana’s treasury company and validator operator announced on August 21 that it would oppose the SGP‑0002 proposal to accelerate SOL disinflation, a change that could lower staking yields for delegators. The proposal seeks to double the annual disinflation rate from 15 % to 30 % while keeping a 1.5 % terminal inflation rate, which the model estimates would reduce issuance by about 18.89 million SOL over six years. Under Solana’s governance design, delegated stake follows a validator’s default vote, but native stakers may override the position without undelegating. An override recorded on August 23 directed 15.5858 SOL for the proposal, demonstrating the mechanism’s operation. The live vote tally, captured on August 23, showed roughly 5.27 million SOL in favor and 547,019 SOL against across 24 votes, representing about 90.6 % of decisive stake at that snapshot. No vote attributed to Solana Company, HSDT or its validator operation was identified in the public tables. The proposal requires two‑thirds of combined for and against stake to pass, with a one‑third participation threshold, and current code locks the totals after the epoch without resolving the quorum definition. Voting runs through epoch 1023 and is scheduled to close at the epoch‑1024 boundary, estimated for Thursday around 15:30 UTC, subject to slot timing. A successful vote would move the proposal into an accepted state, after which technical work via Solana Improvement Documents would be required for implementation and activation. The treasury firm reported that 99.4 % of its Q2 revenue derived from staking on company‑held SOL, amounting to $2.512 million of $2.526 million total revenue, while its income statement recorded a $32.7 million operating loss and a $30.3 million net loss. Staking revenue and validator commission revenue are tracked separately, and the company noted that its quarterly staking rewards were automatically restaked. The potential yield impact under the faster disinflation schedule is projected to fall from 5.84 % to 4.34 % in the first year, then to 3.00 % and 2.25 % in subsequent years, assuming 68 % staking participation. Whether the override mechanism will maintain delegator control over governance choices when a validator’s economic interest is evident remains to be seen.