The GNU in Tripoli faced a setback when allegations emerged that Saddam Haftar, son of eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar and deputy commander of the Libyan National Army, was tied to a series of drone strikes targeting fuel storage facilities and power infrastructure in western Libya in August. The attacks, which damaged a gasoline tank holding approximately 4.5 million litres at the Zawiya oil complex, intensified electricity blackouts and fueled public frustration toward the GNU-led government of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

The strikes complicated ongoing efforts to merge Libya’s divided administrations. US envoy Massad Boulos had proposed a power-sharing arrangement in which Haftar would assume a presidential role while a member of Dbeibah’s family took the premiership. Boulos emphasized the plan was not about familial control but about placing individuals in positions of authority. However, Libyan officials suggested the drone attacks were retaliation for perceived delays in finalizing the merger and for alleged support by Tripoli authorities toward tribal groups opposing Haftar’s forces.

The attacks occurred over five days in August and targeted the Zawiya facility, a key node in Libya’s oil network. The National Oil Corporation confirmed the tank’s collapse and the scale of the fuel loss. Separately, on 5 September, Libyan and Spanish authorities arrested four individuals in southern Tripoli suspected of planning attacks, including on Tripoli airport. Three of those detained were linked to the Tareq ben Ziyad brigade, an LNA-affiliated group. Interviews indicated these operatives were working under Saddam Haftar’s direction.

These developments have cast doubt on the broader 4+4 political track, a UN-sponsored initiative aiming to hold elections within two years. The framework had gained traction as a neutral pathway to unify Libya’s institutions but now faces strain amid accusations of sabotage and deepening rivalries within the Haftar family. While some officials, including UN political affairs minister Walid Ellafi, stress the importance of electoral legitimacy over elite compromises, others warn that excluding figures like Saddam Haftar could destabilize existing power dynamics.

The situation underscores the fragility of Libya’s political architecture, where external proposals must contend with entrenched regional loyalties, familial power bases, and the legacy of conflict since 2011. Whether the GNU can maintain its reform agenda or pivot toward reconciliation with eastern factions remains uncertain, as does the role of foreign mediators in shaping Libya’s future governance.