Sudan's war, now in its fourth year, has become a testing ground for advanced drone systems, reshaping military dynamics across the region.

The conflict began in April 2023 when the Sudanese Armed Forces clashed with the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group with roots in the Janjaweed militia. Early fighting in Khartoum saw limited drone use, but both sides quickly adapted. By March 2025, the Rapid Support Forces had seized control of the capital, prompting a shift in tactics. The group began deploying long-range drones to strike strategic targets, including Port Sudan, Sudan's main port city, from distances exceeding 250 kilometers.

These attacks, which caused widespread power outages and disrupted humanitarian operations, relied on Chinese-made CH-95 and FH-95 drones observed at Nyala Airport. Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab confirmed their presence in April 2025, noting their range could reach critical infrastructure. The Centre for Information Resilience later linked debris from strikes in Port Sudan to earlier attacks in al-Malha, North Darfur, underscoring a pattern of escalating aerial assaults.

Civilian infrastructure bore the brunt of the violence. Between January and June 2026, over 1,100 civilians died in drone-related incidents, according to U.N. data, representing 80% of recorded fatalities during that period. In June 2026, I returned to Khartoum after years in exile and witnessed the aftermath firsthand: darkened streets, damaged power stations, and the wreckage of attacks on the Merowe Dam. Sudan’s energy minister estimated $14 billion in losses to the electricity sector since the war began.

The United Arab Emirates has emerged as a pivotal, though officially denied, supplier of drone technology to the Rapid Support Forces. Multiple U.N. reports and investigative journalism, including coverage by The New York Times, indicate that Emirati personnel have operated Chinese drones from bases in Chad, enabling strikes deep within Sudanese territory. In October 2026, such attacks killed at least 13 children at a displacement shelter in al-Obeid, highlighting the growing threat to civilian populations.

The conflict has intensified a technological arms race. By September 2025, Janes verified the loss of Turkish-made Akıncı drones by the Sudanese Armed Forces and identified components in Rapid Support Forces footage resembling parts of China’s FK-2000 air defense system. In February 2026, a Bayraktar Akıncı drone destroyed an FK-2000 system in South Kordofan, marking a turning point in the use of advanced anti-drone systems.

This exchange reflects broader regional tensions. The Rapid Support Forces, active in western Sudan and Chad, may transfer drone capabilities to militant groups across the Sahel, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates in the Lake Chad Basin. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned Colombian mercenaries and entities linked to drone training for the group, while the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research documented increased drone use by extremist organizations in conflict zones.

Meanwhile, Sudan’s military has countered with Turkish-supplied TB2 drones and anti-drone systems like HİSAR-A. In August 2026, a Sudanese drone strike on a court session in Darfur killed 35 people, illustrating the indiscriminate risks of escalating aerial capabilities. The military has also expanded operations beyond Sudan’s borders, using Egyptian air bases to target Rapid Support Forces supply routes in Libya and northern Chad, drawing accusations from Chadian authorities.

Despite the U.N. Security Council extending Darfur-related sanctions through December 2026, efforts to impose a comprehensive arms embargo have stalled. U.S. proposals for broader restrictions face opposition from China, Russia, and Sudan’s government, which argues that expanded measures would unfairly target state actors protecting civilians. The existing embargo on Darfur, in place since 2004, has failed to prevent weapons transfers, including those facilitated by non-state actors.

Legal experts advocate for targeted measures under the Arms Trade Treaty, which requires states to assess diversion risks and block transfers that could enable serious violations of international humanitarian law. China, as a treaty signatory, is urged to prevent its weapons from reaching Sudanese militias. The United States and European Union, which maintain arms deals with the UAE, are encouraged to condition future sales on compliance with the treaty and the Darfur embargo.

The proliferation of drone technology in Sudan poses long-term risks to regional stability. As combatants innovate, the potential for cross-border transfers to armed groups increases, threatening humanitarian access and civilian safety. While international responses remain fragmented, the conflict underscores the urgent need for coordinated action to address the militarization of emerging technologies.

Yasir Zaidan, a researcher focusing on Middle Eastern influence in the Horn of Africa, has studied these developments extensively. His work highlights the intersection of geopolitical interests, arms transfers, and civilian impact in one of the world’s most complex conflict zones.