I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) announced an 18-month Preservation and Resiliency Campaign on September 30, 2026, aimed at strengthening mental and physical resilience across its ranks. The initiative builds on the Operational Stress Control and Readiness program (OSCAR IV), which was codified in March 2026 through Marine Corps Order 5351.1A. The campaign focuses on improving stress recognition, fostering peer support, and standardizing onboarding for new personnel.

The announcement came during a 22-mile hike at Camp Pendleton, California, where nearly 1,200 Marines and sailors carried 22-pound packs to symbolize the weight of service and the importance of mutual support. Sgt. Maj. Rodney Nevinger, I MEF’s senior enlisted leader, emphasized that showing up for one another is the most critical act of unit cohesion. "The most important thing you did today was to show up," he said during the event.

Lt. Gen. Christian Wortman, I MEF commander, stated the campaign’s goal is to ensure every Marine and sailor is physically, mentally, spiritually, and socially resilient. "We’re 44,500 strong, but life can be cruel. Even the strongest can find themselves on their knees," he said. He framed resilience as a warfighting function essential to operational readiness.

The Tomahawk 22 hike, which covers 22 miles with a 2,700-foot elevation gain, was not a combat readiness test but a symbolic effort to raise awareness about veteran suicide and the need for collective care. Wortman noted the distance was chosen to anchor conversations about suicide prevention and peer intervention.

A key component of the campaign is training small-unit leaders to act as "sensors" — individuals trained to detect signs of distress in their peers and initiate supportive conversations. Carissa Tourtelot, I MEF’s preventative behavioral health director, explained that Marines often prefer seeking help from fellow service members, making peer-to-peer support a critical channel.

The campaign also includes a standardized New-Join onboarding process for new Marines and sailors, designed to integrate them into their units within 90 days. The program emphasizes early connection with sponsors, administrative and medical check-ins, financial readiness training, and mentorship. Wortman issued a directive in August 2026 requiring all subordinate commands to adopt the curriculum, which aims to reduce early-career mental health risks.

OSCAR IV, now part of the broader Marine Corps Total Fitness framework, provides structured training for leaders at all levels to recognize stress signals and respond appropriately. Mobile training teams have been certifying unit trainers since April 2026, with a focus on proactive engagement and baseline establishment within units.

The initiative extends to Navy personnel supporting Marine units, including hospital corpsmen and religious program specialists. Force Master Chief Loren Rucker highlighted that peer support must be mutual — "sometimes it is the Marines saving our corpsmen as well."

According to Pentagon data, the Marine Corps recorded 55 suicides in 2025, down from 61 in 2023 and 43 in 2021. The Navy reported 73 suicides in 2025, up from 70 in 2023. While suicide rates remain a concern, Wortman emphasized that efforts like Tomahawk 22 and OSCAR IV are helping units identify and support struggling service members earlier.

Wortman acknowledged the challenge of maintaining resiliency amid ongoing deployments and training cycles. "We’re under constant pressure, so we must prioritize care for one another without losing focus on the mission," he said.

The campaign’s core message — "no Marine fights alone" — underscores a cultural shift toward encouraging help-seeking behavior and recognizing interdependence as a strength. Leaders are trained to respond when a service member signals distress, with promises of immediate support and follow-up care.

While the campaign is still in its early stages, officials say it represents a sustained effort to embed resilience into daily military life, from deployment cycles to new-unit integration.

Ukrainian forces have demonstrated the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle to extract a wounded soldier from a frontline position, marking one of the first confirmed instances of drone-assisted casualty evacuation in active combat. The operation involved a heavy hexacopter manufactured by Ukrainian firm Gurzuf Defense, which was deployed to retrieve an injured infantryman from the 30th Mechanized Brigade. According to a squad commander from the 92nd Assault Brigade, the mission represented a novel approach for his unit, though the claim of being a global first has not been independently verified. The soldier had been wounded while holding his position, and conventional ground evacuation was deemed too risky due to mines and intense Russian drone activity. Mines and Russian drone strikes had rendered normal extraction routes unsafe, prompting specialists to attempt an aerial recovery using a custom-built drone platform.

The footage, released by the 92nd Assault Brigade, shows the soldier securing himself to the underside of the drone via a harness before being lifted to safety. The drone, described as a heavy-lift hexacopter, carried the soldier while hovering above the battlefield, with the individual dangling beneath its rigid landing structure. The operation required precise coordination, as the soldier remained in communication with drone operators throughout the flight. The aircraft was piloted by a UAV specialist from the 30th Mechanized Brigade and supported by multiple brigades, including the 14th and 30th, as well as the 10th Army Corps.

Ukraine has increasingly turned to uncrewed systems to navigate the dangers of modern warfare, particularly in logistics and medical evacuation. The country has reported conducting over 112,000 UGV-related missions between January and August 2026, though ground robots face challenges such as minefields, uneven terrain, and vulnerability to enemy drones. These limitations have made aerial platforms a more viable option in high-risk zones, where they can reach isolated positions more quickly than ground vehicles. Unlike traditional medevac methods, drone-based extraction does not require fixed routes and can operate in areas inaccessible to larger vehicles.

While this method is relatively new in the context of active frontline combat, it builds on earlier military experiments with unmanned systems. The U.S. military has explored similar concepts, including the use of the K-Max helicopter drone for cargo and casualty transport in Afghanistan and evaluations of drones like the DP-14 Hawk and Flowcopter FC-100 in training exercises. These efforts reflect a broader shift toward autonomous air vehicles capable of operating in contested environments. Ukraine’s approach, however, relies on adapting existing heavy-lift drones for ad hoc medical use rather than deploying purpose-built systems.

The recent operation also coincides with developments in dedicated medical evacuation drones, such as the StarGate model developed by SkyFall. This purpose-built drone features a covered medical stretcher, AI-assisted navigation, and the ability to deploy countermeasures against hostile drones. While such systems offer greater safety and functionality, Ukraine’s current use of modified commercial drones highlights both the ingenuity and limitations of frontline innovation. The soldier extracted in this mission was reportedly able to participate in the harnessing process, underscoring the physical and procedural demands of such operations.

Despite the potential of drone-assisted evacuation, challenges remain, including limited payload capacity, short flight durations, and the need for precise deployment conditions. These systems also lack space for medical personnel, meaning that rescued soldiers must be stable enough to manage their own extraction. Nevertheless, the integration of uncrewed platforms into military operations continues to evolve, offering new possibilities for reducing risk in high-threat environments. As both Ukraine and other nations explore these technologies, the line between experimental use and operational doctrine remains fluid, shaped by real-time battlefield demands and technical constraints.

Between May 10 and 13, 1940, German Panzer Group Kleist moved through the Ardennes Forest, a region the French believed impassable for large armored units. The force consisted of five armored and three motorized infantry divisions, roughly 41,000 vehicles, and advanced along four designated Rollbahnen. When the leading XIX Armored Corps under General Heinz Guderian reached the French city of Sedan, it applied the principle of Schwerpunkt by concentrating three armored divisions on a front just 10 kilometers wide, later narrowing to three kilometers for the Meuse River crossing. Artillery became stuck in traffic, and the Luftwaffe responded with over 1,200 sorties — its most focused bombing campaign of the war — against a four-kilometer sector. After infantry secured a bridgehead on May 14, engineers built a pontoon bridge, the first of three, allowing about 600 tanks to cross. Around 300 anti-aircraft guns were positioned to protect the crossing. Allied counterstrikes involved 167 fighters and bombers but achieved no hits, enabling the German force of 60,000 men and 22,000 vehicles to continue its advance. This operation became a reference point for maneuver warfare.

Decades later, a similar dynamic unfolded during the Russian attempt to cross the Dnipro River near Kherson in spring and summer 2022. Russian forces relied on three bridges to supply 20–30 battalion tactical groups on the western bank. Unlike Sedan, where German advances were supported by overwhelming air and artillery concentration, Russian logistics proved vulnerable. Between July 19 and 28, 2022, Ukrainian forces launched multiple rocket strikes that disabled all three bridges to vehicular traffic. Pontoon bridges attempted as replacements were also destroyed. On November 9, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered a withdrawal across the river, completed two days later.

The contrast between the two operations illustrates how warfare has evolved. At Sedan, mass and concentration enabled a decisive breakthrough; in Kherson, the same principles failed due to precision strikes and sensor-driven interdiction. Modern battlefields, shaped by widespread surveillance and long-range precision fires, have expanded the depth of combat and reduced the survivability of concentrated formations. Logistics, often centralized for efficiency, become disproportionate targets, making sustained mass difficult to maintain.

Technological change has shifted how combat power is applied. Long-range precision systems now operate at the tactical level, altering both deep and close engagements. Battlefield transparency — driven by sensors, drones, and real-time data links — has made it harder to concentrate forces without detection. While dispersion improves survivability, it complicates command, limits the ability to mass fire, and strains logistics. Precision weapons are effective against single targets but less so against dispersed formations, which has led to reliance on drone-guided strikes and loitering munitions.

To compensate, militaries are rethinking force structure. Russian and Chinese brigades, for example, integrate more organic artillery, air defense, and electronic warfare systems than many NATO units. Ukrainian brigades often include drone battalions and distribute drone capabilities across lower echelons. Some analysts suggest increasing the proportion of reconnaissance-strike assets within brigades, either by adding sensors and fires or reducing the number of maneuver units. The balance between concentration and dispersion remains a central challenge.

Historical parallels persist. The French prewar doctrine emphasized defensive firepower and centralized control, aiming to attrit German forces before they could mass. This resembled later NATO approaches on the Eastern Flank, which relied on pre-planned, fire-centric deterrence. German planners, by contrast, pursued swift decision-making through mobility and mass, using the Rucksack-Prinzip to make units self-sufficient in fuel and ammunition. Their advance toward Sedan reflected Prussian doctrine of “march separately, strike combined,” enabling rapid concentration from dispersed formations.

In Ukraine, the need to suppress enemy sensors, command, and fire systems has led to concepts like the “protective screen” described by analyst Jack Watling — a modern equivalent of a creeping barrage. Synchronization, however, has become difficult in environments where mission command and decentralized decision-making are emphasized. As analyst Franz-Stefan Gady noted, convergence requires coordination that can conflict with decentralized execution.

The role of air support has also changed. At Sedan, the Luftwaffe’s VIII Air Corps provided close air support when artillery lagged. Today, drone units such as Russia’s Rubicon center serve a similar function, offering rapid, centralized air capability without the logistical footprint of traditional air units. These systems are used to close gaps that conventional formations cannot address.

Modern offensives, such as Operation Vivaldi in Ukraine, reflect a shift toward limited, incremental gains rather than large-scale breakthroughs. These operations resemble World War I “bite-and-hold” tactics more than the rapid advances of 1940. Success depends less on massed formations and more on disrupting logistics and isolating combat zones. As analyst George Dougherty has argued, restoring maneuverability requires faster transitions from intelligence to fire, as well as force designs tailored to sustained suppression.

The lesson from both Sedan and Kherson is that combat power is no longer derived primarily from concentrated, massed units engaging directly. Instead, it comes from the ability to project precision effects at range, disrupt enemy systems, and adapt to a battlefield where transparency and responsiveness dominate. While mass still matters, it is constrained by logistics and vulnerable to disruption. The future of maneuver may lie not in massed columns, but in synchronized, dispersed effects enabled by manned and unmanned systems working in concert.

Germany has formally abandoned a plan to acquire the larger Block 3 variant of Boeing's MQ-28 Ghost Bat combat drone directly, casting uncertainty over the country's goal of deploying uncrewed combat aircraft alongside crewed fighters before the end of the decade. Boeing confirmed to Breaking Defense that the German Ministry of Defense notified the company it would not move forward with a direct procurement of the system, a decision first disclosed by Politico. The shift follows a broader reevaluation of Germany's unmanned combat aircraft strategy, which had previously included a partnership with Rheinmetall to tailor the Ghost Bat for the Bundeswehr's needs. Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall, had previously stated the collaboration would establish an industrial hub in Germany and Europe, projecting revenue potential in the three-digit million euro range. While the MQ-28 remains in contention for future phases of the program, Berlin is now exploring alternative acquisition pathways that may allow competing designs to demonstrate capabilities before a final selection. The German defense ministry declined to comment on the specifics of the decision, citing procurement regulations and the need for parliamentary oversight. Germany had aimed to field collaborative combat aircraft by 2029, with flight testing scheduled to begin in 2027. However, the revised timeline suggests operational availability may not occur until the early 2030s, potentially extending the development phase. The delay reflects broader challenges in integrating uncrewed systems into existing air force structures, including certification, training, and infrastructure development. Germany's pursuit of unmanned combat platforms is part of a larger effort to modernize its air force, which includes acquiring F-35 stealth fighters and expanding its fleet of Eurofighters. The shift also creates space for other contenders, such as Airbus's U740 Valkyrie, Anduril, General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, and domestic startups like Helsing, which is developing the CA-1 Europa as a potential alternative. While initial focus appears to be on strike capabilities rather than air-to-air missions, Germany has yet to finalize its operational concept for collaborative combat aircraft. The revised approach may allow for a more diversified portfolio, including both high-end and attritable systems, to support both long-range strike missions and enhanced capabilities for existing fourth-generation fighters. The path forward remains subject to evolving requirements and competitive demonstrations, with no definitive timeline established for deployment.

A U.S. Army ambulance is pictured in March 2026. (Jorge Gomez/U.S. Army)

One South Korean service member died and three others were injured Monday morning when a vehicle transporting U.S. and South Korean personnel overturned on the Gyeongbu Expressway near Daegu, approximately 150 miles south of Seoul, according to the U.S. Eighth Army. The crash occurred around 5:07 a.m. after the vehicle struck a median barrier and rolled onto its right side, as reported by Yonhap News Agency citing local police.

The deceased was a 20‑something Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) soldier assigned to U.S. Forces Korea. Two additional KATUSA members were among those hurt; one sustained serious but non‑life‑threatening injuries, while two U.S. service members suffered minor injuries. The U.S. personnel were seated in the front, while the KATUSAs occupied the rear seats, per reporting by Chosun Biz.

Eighth Army spokesman Choi Jung‑won confirmed the incident to Stars and Stripes via email, stating that the injured were taken to nearby hospitals and that no further details were available. He added that the event is under investigation and that the organization mourns the loss of its teammate, extending thoughts and prayers to the families, friends and fellow service members affected.

Choi noted that there were no indications of alcohol or drug involvement, according to Chosun Biz’s report, which did not disclose the source of that information. The identities of the service members have not been released, and additional details remain pending as the investigation proceeds.

Yemeni government-aligned forces appear to have repelled Houthi attempts to secure positions on advantageous terrain and roadways on the western outskirts of Taiz City, according to reports from Yemeni media and an independent Yemen-based journalist on October 17.

The Houthis have been trying to capture Jabal Han, located southwest of the former Yemeni Army 35th Brigade’s camp and Gharab Village, after completing an encirclement of Taiz City on October 12. Government forces have repelled attacks on Jabal Han since October 16, and also engaged Houthi fighters on high ground in Taiz and Lahij governorates that overlooks the Red Sea coastal plain.

On October 17, Yemeni media reported clashes near Sabr al Mawadim District in central Taiz Governorate, with Houthi forces shelling Al Aradha. Saudi airstrikes targeting Houthi telecommunications infrastructure in the same district were also documented, likely aimed at disrupting command-and-control networks.

Separate fighting occurred in Waziyah and Madaribah districts, where the Homeland Shield Forces and Southern Giants Brigades, both aligned with the Yemeni government, attacked Houthi positions. These groups have been engaged in the area since the start of a counteroffensive on October 5 to regain territory on the Red Sea coastal plain, though no significant territorial advances have been reported in recent days.

The Houthis targeted weapons depots near Aden International Airport on October 16 with two ballistic missiles, according to the Yemeni government’s Transportation Ministry. A Houthi military source claimed the strikes hit the headquarters and weapons depots at Camp Badr, a military base at the airport. The Houthis had previously attacked the airport on October 6, claiming they targeted Saudi forces unloading equipment for the Yemeni government.

On October 16, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy likely attacked two tankers northeast of al Jubail, Saudi Arabia. UK Maritime Trade Operations reported an unknown projectile struck one tanker 68 nautical miles northeast of al Jubail, while a small boat, possibly an IRGC fast attack craft, attacked another with a rocket-propelled grenade 78 nautical miles northeast of al Jubail. The IRGC Navy claimed the vessels struck sea mines, though such claims have been used previously to suggest routes outside Iranian control remain unsafe. The attacks occurred outside the Strait of Hormuz and followed a threat on October 9 to strike vessels passing through non-Iranian-approved routes.

Saudi Civil Defense issued alerts for Khamis Mushait, Abha, and Jizan on October 16 and 17 after Houthi launches targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Saudi air defenses intercepted four likely Houthi drones in Riyadh, Eastern, and Southern provinces on October 17. The Houthis have repeatedly attacked military and civilian infrastructure in these areas, aiming to reduce Saudi willingness to sustain operations against them.

Saudi coalition aircraft destroyed two missile launch sites in Houthi-controlled Saada Governorate on October 16, part of efforts to degrade the group’s ability to launch missiles at Saudi territory. The Houthis have continued to target Saudi military and civilian infrastructure, including in Riyadh, as part of their broader strategy.

The Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publish updates on the conflict, providing analysis of developments in Yemen and the broader Middle East. Weekend updates focus on the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to Iran’s war-related activities.

The USS Theodore Roosevelt left Yokosuka Naval Base on Monday after a short port call, heading toward a large-scale biennial exercise taking place in and around Japan through Oct. 29. The carrier, accompanied by the guided-missile cruiser USS Chosin and destroyer USS Decatur, had arrived at the base on Friday to begin maintenance and resupply before joining the drills. The exercise, called Keen Sword, involves roughly 56,000 U.S. and Japanese service members plus forces from seven partner nations, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Philippines — nearly double the number of participants from the previous iteration. South Korea and the United Kingdom are sending observers. Japan is contributing about 45,000 personnel, 6,100 vehicles, 40 vessels and 260 aircraft, according to a Sept. 29 announcement from the Japan Joint Staff. The United States plans to field approximately 11,000 troops, including the Roosevelt’s carrier strike group, which also comprises the destroyers USS Paul Hamilton and USS Carl M. Levin. Maj. Ephesian Poinsette, a spokesman for Keen Sword, said the training focuses on how forces work together — sharing information, coordinating decisions and sustaining operations across services and platforms. He emphasized that the exercise is not aimed at any specific country or regional incident but is intended to reinforce deterrence and preserve peace in the region. This year’s iteration will feature the Marine Corps’ first deployment of two new missile systems, NMESIS and MADIS, to Yonaguni, Japan’s westernmost island, along with about 60 troops from the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment and the U.S. Army. Japan will also conduct anti-ship training using its Type-25 surface-to-ship missile for the first time, though it will not be fired during the exercise. Some Japanese officials spoke to the media on condition of anonymity.