TECHNOLOGY
Nvidia, CoreWeave, and Nebius Secure Large Funding for AI GPU Infrastructure
103d ago · Hacker News
Edition · 2026-07-12
Colorful’s iGame Shadow II DDR5 memory kit reached 8600 MT/s on an iGame X870E Vulcan motherboard with an AMD Ryzen 9 9950X3D processor, setting a record for CXMT‑based DDR5 modules.
Colorful said the kit uses 2 × 16 GB of CXMT 2 GB DDR5 dies and operates at a DRAM frequency of 4299.9 MHz, which equals 8600 MT/s.
The 8600 MT/s speed was achieved with CL46 timings and passed a RunMemTestPro stability test.
Earlier, MSI reported up to 8200 MT/s on a B850 chipset motherboard after a BIOS update.
ASUS achieved about 8400 MT/s on its 800‑series platform with the latest BIOS.
Lexar announced CXMT‑based DDR5 kits at 7600 MT/s with CL38 timings.
The 8600 MT/s result is the highest published frequency for CXMT‑based DDR5 memory kits.
Colorful indicated that reaching 9000 MT/s may be possible as the technology continues to mature.
Apple filed a lawsuit against OpenAI in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on Friday, alleging that the artificial intelligence company misappropriated Apple trade secrets related to hardware development. The complaint stems from an investigation after a former Apple employee left without returning a company laptop, which Apple says was used to access confidential files while the individual was employed at OpenAI. The filing alleges that Chang Liu, a former Apple employee, downloaded dozens of confidential hardware documents, including details on unreleased products, engineering presentations, and proprietary specifications. It also accuses Tang Tan, OpenAI’s head of hardware and former Apple vice president, of directing a scheme to obtain Apple’s trade secrets. OpenAI’s spokesperson Drew Pusateri said the company has no interest in other companies’ trade secrets and remains focused on building innovative technology. OpenAI has denied the allegations. The case mirrors a 2017 dispute in which Google sued Uber over alleged theft of self‑driving technology, a matter that settled and led to criminal charges against a former Google employee. OpenAI recently won a court battle against Elon Musk, and the Apple lawsuit may affect OpenAI’s planned initial public offering and its competition in the AI hardware market. Apple did not indicate whether CEO Sam Altman was involved, but said the alleged misconduct could extend beyond the individuals named. The lawsuit remains pending.
Apple filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on July 10, 2026, accusing OpenAI and two former Apple employees of stealing trade secrets to support OpenAI’s hardware development.
The complaint names Tang Tan, former vice president of product design at Apple, and Chang Liu, a senior system electrical engineer, as defendants. Both individuals left Apple in early 2026 to join OpenAI.
Apple alleges that Tan used confidential project codenames during interviews, instructed candidates still employed at Apple to bring hardware components and prototypes to OpenAI interview sessions, and distributed an internal “Need to Know” document containing security protocols to new OpenAI hires. Liu is accused of downloading a 1,000‑page compilation of technical files, including circuit board manufacturing details, after exploiting a security flaw and of failing to return an Apple‑issued laptop.
The lawsuit further alleges that OpenAI directed employees to bring CAD files, design artifacts, and information about toolchains, simulation tools, and vendor selections to interviews, and that a trusted partner was asked to perform Apple’s proprietary metal‑finishing process without permission. Apple states that more than 400 former Apple employees now work at OpenAI.
The suit seeks injunctive relief and damages and comes as OpenAI works to launch its first consumer hardware products, including a rumored smartphone slated for 2028 and a HomePod‑style smart speaker.
US Central Command said it conducted a third series of strikes this week against 140 Iranian military targets in the Strait of Hormuz region.
By · 103d ago · Source: bbc
US Central Command said it conducted a third series of strikes this week against 140 Iranian military targets in the Strait of Hormuz region. The strikes hit missile and drone sites, communications networks and coastal surveillance locations after Iran attacked the MV GFS Galaxy, a Cyprus‑flagged vessel, damaging its engine room and leaving one crew member missing.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced it had closed the Strait of Hormuz indefinitely and warned that any US aggression would be met with a strong response. The IRGC said its response included strikes on the Prince Hassan Air Base in Jordan, which it said destroyed the base’s command centre and MQ‑9 drone hangars.
Within hours of the US strikes, Iranian‑aligned groups in the Gulf launched missiles and drones that were intercepted by the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain. Earlier in the week, three commercial tankers were attacked in Omani waters, prompting a previous round of US strikes that killed 17 people and injured 115, according to Iranian officials.
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said Iran had made a choice that would have consequences. Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said the era of one‑sided deals was over. The Strait closure follows a public statement by Iran’s new supreme leader urging retaliation. Diplomatic talks are expected to continue despite the heightened tensions, and mediators are working to revive a stalled process. The long‑term effect on shipping and energy markets remains unclear.
On Sunday, July 12, 2026, the United States and Iran exchanged attacks after Iran fired at a civilian vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, leading the United States to strike about 140 Iranian military targets. The conflict escalated in late February when the United States and Israel launched strikes that degraded Iran’s military and killed many senior officers. A June agreement temporarily halted the fighting, but the United States said it still wants to pursue diplomatic talks. U.S. Central Command reported hitting missile and drone sites, naval assets and communications networks. Missile alerts and sirens sounded in Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, where U.S. forces are based, but no damage or injuries were reported. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the United States responded to Iran’s attack on the M/V GFS Galaxy, a Cyprus‑flagged container ship, in order to protect civilian mariners. CENTCOM said the strikes were directed by President Trump and aimed at degrading Iran’s ability to attack civilian ships and commercial vessels transiting the strait. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it fired warning shots at a vessel attempting an unauthorized route and said the strait would remain closed until further notice until U.S. interference ceases. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said the United States must fulfill its obligations or face repercussions. The latest exchanges have renewed concerns about the durability of the temporary ceasefire and the prospects for a diplomatic resolution.
Ukrainian forces struck 28 Russian seaborne vessels, including 21 tankers, in the Sea of Azov on the night of July 10‑11, according to the Ukrainian General Staff and the commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces, Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi. The attacks targeted tankers transporting petroleum products that violate international sanctions and other vessels supporting Russian military logistics, and they prompted Russia to close maritime routes through the Kerch Strait and the Don‑Azov Canal, citing security concerns.
Starboard Maritime Intelligence reported a 55 percent decline in vessels with active automatic identification system (AIS) transponders in the Sea of Azov between June 30 and July 11, falling from 267 to 120. AIS signals can be spoofed or jammed, and Russian forces have been reported to jam AIS transponder signals in the region.
The strikes are part of a broader Ukrainian effort to isolate occupied Crimea and disrupt Russian logistics, particularly the transport of petroleum and grain. Interfax cited data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service indicating that consumer gasoline prices rose 6.88 percent in June 2026, with AI‑92 up 7.3 percent, AI‑95 up 6.7 percent, AI‑98 up 3.1 percent and diesel up 7.1 percent. Shortages were reported in at least 78 of Russia’s 83 federal subjects and in occupied Ukraine, affecting civilian consumption and military logistics.
On July 10 President Volodymyr Zelensky signed decrees establishing the Long‑Range (Global) Influence Command and the Joint Rapid Response Forces within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, appointing Brigadier General Dmytro Voloshyn as commander of the latter. Russian forces launched six Iskander‑M and S‑400 ballistic missiles, four Kh‑59/69 guided cruise missiles, two Kh‑31 anti‑radar missiles and 121 Shahed‑type strike drones overnight; the Ukrainian Air Force reported downing 111 drones and two cruise missiles, with missiles and drones striking 11 locations and debris falling on three.
Additional Ukrainian strikes hit Russian energy infrastructure, including the Titan‑Barrikady research and production centre in Volgograd (estimated damage $105 million), the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal, units of the Slavneft‑Yanos oil refinery, and multiple aviation fuel tanks at the Borisoglebsk military airfield. Russian forces reported limited advances in northern Sumy Oblast and in the Kharkiv region, while Ukrainian forces conducted counter‑attacks near Kupyansk, Borova and other fronts. The intensified campaign continues to strain Russian fuel supplies and logistics, while Ukraine expands its long‑range strike capability with new commands.
The United States and Iran have agreed to resume negotiations after a series of strikes on Iranian territory between July 8 and 9, though Iran's negotiating position and war aims remain unchanged.
Iran seeks to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz, preserve its nuclear program, and protect Hezbollah, while attempting to deter Gulf states from supporting efforts to end its control of the waterway. Open-source intelligence reported that on July 9 unspecified targets were struck in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan; Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island in Hormozgan; and Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.
Iran launched attacks against Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar on July 9 in response to the U.S. strikes. The United States and Iraq are preparing to sign an agreement under which the United States will invest in Iraq in exchange for Iraq curbing Iranian influence; Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is expected to sign the deal during his upcoming visit to Washington, D.C., beginning June 15.
The agreement also calls for the Iraqi federal government to disarm Iranian‑backed militias and dismantle their financial networks, a requirement the United States has pressed since 2025. Baghdad formed a disarmament committee in early June and has set a deadline of the end of September, coinciding with the planned withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces.
Iraqi militia groups have sought to circumvent disarmament. Some reported handing over inoperable weapons while retaining functional ballistic missiles and drones, which officials say are the main obstacle to full disarmament. Two senior Iranian sources told Reuters that Iran views control of the Strait of Hormuz as critical leverage and will not discuss its nuclear program unless the United States acknowledges that control; Iran has conditioned any talks on a cessation of Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
U.S. sanctions on July 10 targeted eight individuals and six entities, including Dubai financier Ali Ansari, who oversees assets linked to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Maritime activity in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf was reported as unchanged.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah appears to be discouraging the Lebanese government from using force to disarm the group. President Joseph Aoun said he will discuss cooperation with Hezbollah on disarmament during a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump on July 21, but analysts note that Hezbollah is unlikely to disarm voluntarily and has warned that any forced disarmament could trigger civil conflict.
The Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council announced on July 10 a legal initiative with Prime Minister Zaydi to reduce penalties for officials who return stolen public funds, a measure viewed as having limited enforcement capacity. The initiative follows a 2022 amnesty that failed to recover over $5 billion in embezzled funds.
The overall situation remains fluid, with the outcome of the U.S.–Iran talks and the Iraqi disarmament effort still uncertain.
A July 10, 2026, Congressional Research Service report titled "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Regional Nuclear Capabilities" outlines the United States' policy of extending nuclear deterrence to more than 30 allied and partner nations. The 2010, 2018, and 2022 Nuclear Posture Reviews argued that strengthening extended deterrence advanced U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals. The 2026 National Defense Strategy did not address extended deterrence, saying that allies and partners would take primary responsibility for their own defense with limited U.S. support. Some members of Congress said they were concerned about the Trump administration's commitment to extended deterrence and about allies' interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. The report calls for additional review of the policy to ensure alignment with nonproliferation objectives.
On July 6, the People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted a test of a submarine‑launched ballistic missile in the South Pacific, with the missile landing between Tuvalu and the Gilbert Islands of Kiribati, according to maritime notices from the People’s Republic of China. The test is the first publicly reported SLBM launch since 1982 and follows a 2024 Pacific missile test that landed near French Polynesia. Chinese state media reported the launch but did not identify the missile model or exact launch location, noting possible sites in the Bohai Sea or South China Sea. Analysts say the launch is intended to demonstrate a second‑strike capability and to enable strikes on the United States from within PRC internal waters. The missile is believed to be a JL‑3, a system with a reported range of 10,000 kilometers, although Taiwanese officials say it may be a JL‑2 with a range of 8,000 kilometers. The launching vessel was likely a Type 09IV ballistic missile submarine, the PLA’s only active SSBN. US officials estimate that China could possess between 20 and 30 missile‑armed submarines by 2040, up from its current fleet of about a dozen. In the same period, the PLA increased coast‑guard patrols east of Taiwan, deactivating automatic identification systems on ships after roughly 24 hours to impede tracking. PLA publications have emphasized the integration of artificial‑intelligence algorithms into military operations and the development of domestic AI chips. Personnel promotions were announced on July 3, with two officers elevated to full general and new assignments within the Central Military Commission. Separately, the PLA and Russia commenced joint naval exercises near Qingdao from July 6 to July 13, and Japan signed a memorandum to expand defense cooperation with the Philippines, including a transfer of five Japanese destroyer escorts to the Philippine Navy. Australia and Fiji signed a mutual defense treaty on July 6, establishing visiting forces agreements and a mutual defense clause. The series of developments highlights China’s expansion of its nuclear undersea capabilities and its broader strategic outreach in the Indo‑Pacific, while regional partners deepen security ties in response.
Hizballah’s coordinated drone and rocket attacks from April 15 to June 14 created a continuous risk of uncontrolled escalation and led the United States to incorporate Lebanon into the June 15 framework agreement with Iran.
U.S. and Iranian officials announced the framework on June 15, focusing on the nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz, while a ceasefire between Israel and Hizballah had held since April 16. American diplomats had previously treated Lebanon separately, but Hizballah’s attacks linked the two fronts.
Data from Alma Research and Education Center and Hizballah statements show 1,155 attacks in the period, including 540 drone strikes and 615 rocket, missile and artillery incidents. From May 12 to June 14, drone attacks made up 228 of 379 total drone missions, following Israel’s cross‑Litani incursion on May 4.
The pattern reflects a risk strategy described by Thomas Schelling, in which measured escalation raises the possibility of spillover that can be used as leverage in negotiations. Iranian officials repeatedly stated that any agreement excluding Lebanon would be meaningless, and state media described Hizballah as central to Iran’s national interests.
The inclusion of Lebanon ties the broader Iran deal to a conflict the United States did not start, obliging Washington to manage a war it cannot abandon without jeopardizing the larger agreement. Israel’s continued presence in southern Lebanon now conflicts with U.S. goals to de‑escalate and withdraw, while Iranian diplomatic pressure seeks to preserve Hizballah’s role as a bargaining chip.
The United States has indicated it may use diplomatic pressure and limit arms transfers to influence Israeli behavior, but no clear mechanism exists to resolve the contradiction between supporting Lebanese sovereignty and tolerating Iranian influence through Hizballah. The situation remains unresolved as attacks continue and diplomatic talks stall.
This edition was assembled from neutral, agent-rewritten summaries of the day's aggregated news.
Why it matters: Every article was reviewed for loaded language, partisan framing, and missing attribution before publication.