Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia is preparing to receive about 30,000 North Korean soldiers and additional ballistic missiles, while also renovating facilities at its Sohae launch site for a possible military reconnaissance satellite launch.

Zelensky did not specify when the troops or missiles would arrive. Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov did not comment on the remarks.

North Korea previously sent an estimated 15,000 soldiers to Russia, which supported Russian operations in Kursk Oblast and performed rear area functions. The new deployments are intended to replace Russian battlefield casualties and are likely to provide economic benefits to North Korea.

Ukrainian Military Intelligence reported that North Korea has supplied over 100 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles to Russia, with at least 80 already used.

Satellite imagery shows that North Korea is renovating launch facilities at Sohae and may conduct a rocket engine test in early July, indicating preparations for its first military reconnaissance satellite launch since 2024.

North Korea is also expanding port facilities at Rason and Nampo to support larger surface combatants and to create basing infrastructure for a nascent green‑water navy. Worker camps have been constructed near the Rajin Shipyard, and the guided‑missile destroyer Kang Kon was towed to Rason for repairs after a failed launch and partial capsizing in May 2025.

Kim Jong Un has set a goal of building two Choe Hyon‑class guided‑missile destroyers each year through 2030 and has suggested a target of two 10,000‑ton cruisers per year, although it is unclear whether this is in addition to the destroyer goal.

North Korea’s naval expansion aims to protect vessels from enemy attack, enable operations beyond its immediate waters, and secure sea lines of communication, though its surface fleet remains inferior to South Korean and United States fleets.

North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Moscow and met with President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, confirming North Korea’s continued support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s support for North Korea’s security objectives.

Lavrov stated that Russia no longer supports denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and state media said Russia backs North Korea’s efforts to defend itself against hostile acts.

Bilateral trade between North Korea and the People’s Republic of China reached $1.5 billion in the first half of 2026, the highest level since 2017, and a new Yalu River Bridge is expected to open by the end of 2026.

Pyongyang invited Russian and Chinese youth to the Songdowon International Children’s Camp for the first time since 2025, a move that reflects improved ties with both countries.

South Korea detained the cargo ship Prada, registered in Tanzania, at the port of Pyeongtaek on suspicion of exporting North Korean coal and iron ore in violation of United Nations sanctions. South Korean intelligence estimates that North Korea shipped at least 1.5 million tons of coal to China in 2025, a fivefold increase since 2019, partly due to the termination of a UN sanctions monitoring body and the resumption of trade after the COVID‑19 pandemic.

South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong‑young announced the “Seven Major Reforms,” calling for a peace‑first approach, a halt to North Korean nuclear production before full denuclearization, and reduced drone flights near the inter‑Korean border. North Korea has rejected dialogue proposals and declared denuclearization a final and irreversible matter.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s approval ratings remained low in July, fluctuating between 46 and 48 percent, with disapproval ratings exceeding approval ratings for the first time since his inauguration. Party support for the president varied, with the ruling Democratic Party showing higher approval than the opposition People Power Party.

U.S. Central Command announced on July 28 that the naval blockade in the Middle East, reinstated on July 14, remains in effect, with 17 commercial vessels redirected, two vessels disabled by kinetic action, and two others boarded to verify compliance. Two carrier strike groups, USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush, continue to operate in the CENTCOM area of responsibility to support maritime security and stability. The blockade was reinstated after a period of pause in the airstrike campaign. In the Pacific, USS George Washington transited the Luzon Strait westbound on July 22 and entered the South China Sea, escorted by the cruiser USS Robert Smalls and destroyers USS Benfold and USS Shoup. A serious encounter between the Philippine Navy and the China Coast Guard at Second Thomas Shoal resulted in the medical evacuation of a Filipino Navy SEAL, marking the most severe direct engagement between the two forces to date. A U.S. Coast Guard cutter was present to provide support. U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Lee Lipton wrote on X that the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group’s F‑35‑equipped air wing was upholding freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. USS Theodore Roosevelt led a group sail as part of the final phase of Rim of the Pacific 2026 on July 22, approximately 100 nautical miles northeast of Kauai, Hawaii, with more than 20 American and allied warships participating, according to public AIS data. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower departed Naval Station Norfolk on July 22 to conduct an ammunition onload with USNS Medgar Evers, with MH‑60S Seahawks from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 11 transporting ammunition in the Atlantic; the carrier returned to homeport after completing the operation. USS Tripoli returned to Sasebo, Japan, over the weekend after a six‑month deployment covering CENTCOM and PACOM areas, stopping at White Beach Naval Facility in Okinawa to disembark elements of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit before resuming its homeport duties. USS Boxer, flagship of the deployed amphibious ready group, conducted a vertical replenishment with USNS Carl Brashear on July 20. Overall, the United States has three carriers deployed, three additional carriers in training or port, four in maintenance, and one used primarily for training; three amphibious ready groups are deployed, five are in training or port, and three are in maintenance. The status of the carrier deployments and the continuation of the blockade will be reviewed as the month progresses.

Newly obtained Defense Department records indicate that at least 17 U.S. service members suffered life‑threatening injuries. More than 400 total casualties were recorded between February 28 and April 8, during the initial phase of the conflict with Iran, before a two‑week ceasefire was declared.

The data, obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request by The War Horse, provide the most detailed accounting of individual injury incidents, including service branch, rank, injury type, and date. This level of detail was not previously available in public reports.

The records show that 270 of the roughly 400 casualties were Army personnel, with about one‑third of those soldiers being reservists. Enlisted ranks accounted for the majority of Army injuries. The Navy reported 64 casualties, the Air Force 51, and the Marine Corps 19, though those services did not specify injury types. At least 170 troops sustained head trauma, a pattern that military health experts say may become the signature injury of this conflict. A colonel stationed at an operations center in Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, was injured when an Iranian drone struck the building on March 1, killing six service members and causing concussive blast injuries to everyone inside. The colonel reported persistent headaches and vision problems after the attack. Two senior officers, Brig. Gen. Clint Barnes and Maj. Gen. Brad Hinson, also suffered head trauma that day. The Pentagon has not responded to requests for comment.

Neuropsychologist Michael McCrea said that most traumatic brain injuries classified as mild show no structural damage on imaging and typically resolve fully, but long‑term effects such as cognitive decline, memory problems, and balance issues can emerge weeks or months later. Retired Army Lt. Gen. Eric Schoomaker warned that repeated mild injuries may have lasting consequences.

The records also show that after the ceasefire was declared on July 8, more than 200 additional casualties were logged in Department of Defense databases under the category "Overseas Operations," including four fatalities, indicating continued exposure of U.S. troops to Iranian attacks.

President Donald Trump welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the White House on Dec. 29, saying he preferred to avoid further bombing of Iran.

The United States ended about two weeks of air strikes against Iran after hostilities resumed when negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz collapsed. Iran then halted retaliatory attacks on Gulf states. Brent crude fell below $84 a barrel, down from more than $100 earlier in the week.

Trump told Fox News he held a strong position and threatened to strike Iran’s major bridges if no agreement is reached, but added he would like to avoid military action. Netanyahu said in a video posted on Instagram that his conversation with Trump was cooperative and that both leaders shared the goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Netanyahu was in Washington for the funeral of Senator Lindsey Graham, a longtime Iran hawk, and his presence highlighted existing tensions between the two leaders over the war.

Israeli officials view a potential Iranian nuclear capability as an existential threat. Trump has said he will prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons but is willing to postpone direct talks, focusing instead on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and lowering oil prices. Israeli officials also expressed concern about a possible U.S. sale of F‑35 fighter jets to Turkey, which they fear could fuel a regional arms race, though a senior Israeli official said the issue was not raised in the meeting.

The meeting did not include pressure on Netanyahu to accelerate operations in Gaza or to withdraw troops from Lebanon, according to Israeli officials. Negotiators from Iran and Oman are working to restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a step that could restart formal talks on Iran’s nuclear program and end the conflict. An Iranian official told state television that Tehran is not satisfied with Oman’s proposal for shared control of the strait.

Lower oil prices have reduced gasoline costs, potentially easing political pressure on Trump ahead of the November midterm elections. Despite the pause in attacks, regional tensions remain high, with few vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz with transponders activated, and Iran continuing to threaten vessels that do not have its permission. The United States has reinstated a naval blockade to prevent ships from docking in Iranian ports.

The outcome of the meeting and the forthcoming Oman‑Iran agreement remain unresolved, leaving the path to a diplomatic solution uncertain.

Iranian officials and competing domestic factions continue to debate control of the Strait of Hormuz as the United States maintains a naval blockade and considers a 10‑day truce mediated by Oman. A US official and Omani mediators told Western media on July 27 that the truce proposal requires Iran to reopen the strait in exchange for lifting the naval blockade and unfreezing Iranian assets.

Three internal groups are influencing Iran’s negotiation policy. The IRGC‑Vahidi faction, led by IRGC commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, is willing to negotiate with the United States but refuses to end the war without complete control of the strait. The group accepted a memorandum of understanding in June but resumed missile attacks after determining that full control was unattainable.

The pro‑negotiation camp, which includes President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, argues that limited control of the strait can be secured without further economic damage. A Tasnim op‑ed on July 28 noted that abandoning the strait would be viewed as failure and highlighted the strategic importance of the waterway.

The ultra‑hardline Paydari Front, represented by Supreme National Security Council member Saeed Jalili, opposes any negotiations with the United States and bases its position on revolutionary principles. While a small minority, its proximity to decision‑making bodies requires other factions to consider its views.

Economic pressures from US sanctions, the naval blockade and frozen assets have intensified public discontent. High unemployment, a collapsed rial and shortages of basic goods have been reported. On July 28, at least 100 residents protested in Malekshahr, Esfahan Province, over the judiciary’s execution of three individuals involved in earlier protests.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said the strait is a key indicator of Iran’s war success and that Iran is not afraid of any action to establish its sovereignty.

Regional incidents include Houthi claims of striking the Saudi‑flagged tanker NCC Ghazal on July 28, marking its third attack on Saudi shipping since July 22. The United Kingdom Maritime Operations Center has not confirmed the attack. Commercial ship‑tracking data show that at least four Saudi oil tankers transited the Bab al‑Mandeb since the Houthi blockade began on July 20. The People’s Republic of China requested that the Houthis allow safe passage for Chinese‑owned tankers through the Red Sea, according to sources speaking to Reuters.

Iranian media reported that Iranian forces used 358, Majid and Ghaem‑118 missiles to down US MQ‑9 Reaper drones, with the 358 missile having a 100‑kilometer range, an 8,500‑meter ceiling and a cruise speed of about 700 kilometers per hour. The Majid air defense system can engage targets from 700 meters to 8 kilometers altitude, and the Ghaem‑118 has a 25‑kilometer range.

Lebanese Armed Forces seized a Hezbollah weapons cache in southern Lebanon on July 27 under a trilateral framework agreement that requires disarmament in pilot zones. Iraqi militia statements denied responsibility for attacks on Saudi oil facilities, while coalition forces intercepted drones targeting US bases in Iraq. Bahrain began a GCC military exercise on July 30, and Iran has threatened Gulf states’ oil exports through its control of the Strait of Hormuz. The internal power struggle and the Omani truce proposal will shape Iran’s ability to retain leverage over the strait and the broader conflict with the United States.

Japan’s Joint Staff Office announced on July 26 that a joint Chinese‑Russian naval patrol took place near Japan on July 25, 2026, highlighting continued military cooperation between the two nations.

The patrol is part of an annual series of joint exercises that began in 2021, with this year’s training phase called “Maritime Interaction” by Russia and “Joint Sea” by China running from July 6 to July 13 in Qingdao, China.

The Chinese contingent included cruiser CNS Anshan (103) and destroyer CNS Kaifeng (124); the Russian side contributed corvette RFS Rezkiy (343) and fleet oiler CNS Kekexilihu (903). Anshan was sighted at 4 p.m. local time sailing 220 km (137 mi) northeast of Cape Inubō on Honshu, while Kaifeng, Kekexilihu and Rezkiy were located 130 km (81 mi) southeast of the same cape later that day. By Saturday, the four vessels were positioned about 300 km (187 mi) southeast of Cape Nosappu on Hokkaido.

On July 19, Kaifeng conducted a live‑fire drill firing machine guns in Japan’s exclusive economic zone around Okinotori Island in the Philippine Sea, prompting a protest from Japan, according to USNI News.

Earlier on July 25, a Russian IL‑20 electronic intelligence aircraft departed the Russian mainland, entered the Pacific via the Sea of Okhotsk, flew south parallel to Miyagi Prefecture on Honshu before returning to the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk, the JSO said.

Japan’s Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi stated that the Ministry of Defense and the Self‑Defense Forces will continue to monitor Chinese and Russian movements with strong interest and maintain readiness for airspace‑violation countermeasures.

Japanese aircraft were scrambled 139 times in the first quarter of fiscal year 2026, 122 of which responded to Chinese aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles and none to other categories, an increase from 132 scrambles in the comparable period of the previous year.

Additional flight activity recorded between April and June included Russian IL‑20 ELINT sorties over the Sea of Japan on April 7 and May 21, a Chinese Y‑9 ELINT aircraft over the East China Sea on May 28, and a joint bomber flight on June 27 involving Chinese H‑6 bombers and Russian Tu‑95 aircraft that traversed the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea.

Japan continues to track the movements of Chinese and Russian forces, with the latest patrol indicating sustained activity in the waters surrounding its northern islands.