On August 7, 2026, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian‑backed militias, announced that it would postpone a planned response to recent United States and Saudi airstrikes on militia positions in Iraq after mediation by Hadi al Ameri, head of the Badr Organization.

The United States and Saudi Arabia conducted airstrikes on militia positions in Iraq on July 27, killing at least 20 Popular Mobilization Force members and several IRGC officers, and the Iraqi government has said it will complete its disarmament of militia weapons by September 30 before the withdrawal of the US‑led coalition.

A senior Saudi official told Western and regional media that the militias were coordinating with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Houthi movement to plan multiple attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and other sites, with some reports indicating the attacks could be launched within the next 48 hours.

Iraqi security forces deployed units from Anbar, Salah al Din and Nineveh provinces to Baghdad, and the prime minister ordered intensified inspections of checkpoints and the detention of vehicles carrying illegal weapons or explosives, a move Iraqi media described as unprecedented.

The militias said their response would be contingent on Saudi Arabia issuing an official apology, compensating victims’ families and damage to Iraqi property, and curbing anti‑militia discourse in Iraqi media, and they warned they could resume attacks if those demands are not satisfied.

Iranian officials have pressed for greater concessions on the Strait of Hormuz, including formal recognition of Iran’s control over the waterway, transit fees, and guarantees that the United States will lift its naval blockade and sanction relief for Iranian oil, while U.S. officials said the current proposal contains no transit fees.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement on August 7 that provides for mutual defensive support only, extending a previous bilateral pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and reflecting a broader regional effort to strengthen security cooperation against Iranian‑aligned threats.

The situation remains unresolved, with the Iraqi militias retaining the option to restart attacks if Saudi demands are not met and diplomatic talks on the Strait of Hormuz continuing without a final agreement.

Japan test‑fired a Tomahawk cruise missile from the destroyer Chokai on July 29, a weapon with a 1,600 km range that can reach PRC territory when launched from a ship near Japan, and announced plans to acquire 400 of the missiles. Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper, released August 4, identified PRC short‑of‑war coercion as a major threat and described frequent combined PRC‑Russia deployments and flights near Japanese territory as demonstrations of force. PRC Ministry of Defense spokesperson Chen Xi criticized the white paper on August 4, saying it exaggerated the threat and that Japan was using the PRC as a pretext for remilitarization. Japan’s Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said the white paper was intended for civilian readers. The PLA Navy’s Type 076 amphibious assault vessel Sichuan, with a displacement over 50,000 tons, was reported by state broadcaster CCTV to be capable of operating manned aircraft and to function as a quasi‑aircraft carrier, a capability that could supplement the PLAN’s limited carrier aviation. ISW‑CDOT analysis notes that the vessel’s single electromagnetic catapult limits its sortie rate and that it can launch large drones to support older carriers that lack catapults. In the South China Sea, the Philippines filed a nautical chart with the UN on July 31 detailing its claimed territorial baseline around Scarborough Shoal, invoking UNCLOS and a 2016 arbitration decision. The PRC embassy in Manila warned the Philippines to respect PRC sovereignty, and the CCG conducted a law‑enforcement drill around the shoal on August 1 involving boarding and seizure exercises. PRC state media described the drills as part of a broader toolbox of countermeasures against Philippine actions. PRC fishing and cargo vessels have been linked to undersea cable sabotage; a PRC‑flagged research vessel, likely Shiyan 1, loitered over the Pacific Light Cable Network from July 28 to August 2, raising concerns about potential disruption of Taiwan’s internet infrastructure. Taiwan increased its military recruitment to 17,113 personnel in 2025, exceeding its target, and its retention rate rose to 87.2 percent, according to the Ministry of National Defense. Taiwan’s Supreme Court classified the CCP and Taiwan Affairs Office as foreign hostile forces under the Anti‑Infiltration Act, a ruling that was upheld on July 29. The United States and Taiwan publicized their first combined Coast Guard patrol in Taiwanese waters on July 28, following a 2021 memorandum of understanding to improve maritime security cooperation. PLA aircraft conducted 190 incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in July, a decline from earlier peaks and suggesting a possible shift in PRC coercion strategy. Japan’s test‑fire and procurement of Tomahawks, together with its white paper emphasis on PRC coercion, indicate that Japan views PRC pressure as ineffective, while the PLAN may employ the Type 076 vessel to expand its carrier‑based aviation capability despite operational constraints. These developments illustrate a multi‑theater security environment in which defense modernization, territorial disputes, and undersea infrastructure vulnerabilities intersect.

The KC-135 Stratotanker that collided mid‑air with another tanker over Iraq on March 12, 2026, and lost its tail, arrived at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma on August 3 to begin programmed depot maintenance. All six crew members of the aircraft with call sign Zeus 95 were killed, including Maj. John A. Klinner, Capt. Ariana G. Savino, Tech. Sgt. Ashley B. Pruitt, Capt. Seth R. Koval, Capt. Curtis J. Angst, and Master Sgt. Tyler H. Simmons, who was later promoted posthumously. The surviving jet, serial number 63‑8017, had previously landed at Ben Gurion Airport in Israel after the collision and later received a replacement tail at RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom on August 2. Images released by photographer Andrew McKelvey show the aircraft with half of its vertical stabilizer missing.

The Air Force said the aircraft will undergo programmed depot maintenance, a process that typically takes about 155 days but may be extended based on findings. The 76th Aircraft Maintenance Group’s Expeditionary Depot Maintenance Flight completed more than 200 repairs in three weeks, enabling damaged KC‑135s to return to mission capability before being sent to Tinker for comprehensive overhaul.

Since March, at least 40 U.S. aircraft have been damaged or destroyed in operations related to Iran, including five tankers hit during an attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Additional tankers bearing temporary shrapnel repairs arrived at RAF Mildenhall in August, including serial numbers 59‑1444 and 63‑8028. The Air Force has not disclosed how many damaged aircraft have been sent to Tinker for repair, nor the specifics of the work performed on 63‑8017 prior to its arrival.

The Air Force noted that repairing battle‑damage aircraft provides a practical training exercise that could be valuable in future Pacific operations, though the full scope of repairs on 63‑8017 is still being determined.

In Poznań, Poland, U.S. service members report that personal value‑added tax (VAT) relief stipulated in the 2020 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement has not yet been implemented.

The agreement provides tax exemptions for official government purchases, but a specific mechanism for individual service members remains unresolved.

Staff Sgt. Anthony Zeccardi said the 23 % VAT increases the cost of everyday items and complicates his ability to purchase supplies for law school. He noted that the tax is included in displayed prices rather than added at checkout.

Service members in Germany can claim reimbursements through an online app by submitting receipts, while those in Italy must provide written estimates and money orders before receiving a refund form.

EUCOM stated it is coordinating with Poland to develop a bilateral arrangement required to deliver personal tax relief, as outlined in the EDCA. An anonymous official said personal VAT relief is a medium priority while other implementation efforts continue; official government purchases have already been addressed, but personal relief is considered less urgent.

Mike Bush, who served 11 years at NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast headquarters in Szczecin, received quarterly VAT reimbursements for a range of expenses, including groceries, utilities and fuel. Records show his claims returned more than 1,180 zloty, roughly $317, per quarter, and exceeded 10,000 zloty for larger purchases. He described the process of gathering invoices, organizing them chronologically and submitting them to Polish tax authorities every three months.

An anonymous official warned that the lack of personal VAT relief could affect military retention and recruitment in Poland, as personnel may cite the absence of tax benefits when deciding to leave.

The issue remains unresolved, and EUCOM has not announced a timeline for a personal VAT relief program for U.S. personnel stationed in Poland.

Boeing has received a $75 million undefinitized contract action from the U.S. Air Force to commence production of the Joint Direct Attack Munition‑Long Range (JDAM‑LR) for the U.S. Navy, following test launches of the weapon from F/A‑18E/F Super Hornet fighters in April.

The JDAM‑LR adds a turbojet engine and fold‑out wing kit to a 500‑pound bomb, providing a range of more than 300 nautical miles.

The contract, announced by Boeing on [date], represents the initial production order for the JDAM‑LR. The Air Force, as the program’s joint‑service manager, will place orders for the Navy, and the design may be offered to allied nations. Boeing has contributed nearly $100 million of its own funds to the program, which traces its development to the late 2010s. Standard JDAM kits have historically cost between $20,000 and $30,000; the inclusion of a TDI‑J85 turbojet and wing kit raises the unit cost, though precise pricing has not been disclosed. The weapon employs GPS‑assisted inertial navigation and can be equipped with additional guidance modes for moving targets. The Navy’s pursuit of extended‑range munitions follows the cancellation of earlier programs such as the JSOW and LRAM variants, and reflects concerns about munitions stockpiles and operational range in contested environments. Production is expected to bolster carrier air wing capabilities and may be expanded to other services and partners.

The Navy plans to integrate the JDAM‑LR into its strike inventory, with full operational availability anticipated over the coming years.

The U.S. Navy announced on July 29 that it is seeking a payload launcher capable of supporting a wider variety of payloads for its future attack submarines, according to a public solicitation. The Director of Submarine Programs issued the interest notice ahead of an industry day scheduled for September 29‑30 in Alexandria, Virginia, where representatives from General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding will present concepts. The Navy said the launcher must enable payloads to be launched and recovered while the boat is underway, allow secure data exchange with the host vessel, and be rechargeable and maintainable while embarked, with designs focused on producibility and sustainment. Although unmanned underwater vessels were not named in the solicitation, attributes for supporting such equipment were highlighted. The interest comes as the Navy develops the Next‑Generation Attack Submarine (SSN(X)) and modernizes the Virginia‑class fleet, which are intended to increase speed and payload capacity to counter growing undersea threats. U.S. Navy intelligence expects the People’s Liberation Army Navy Submarine Force to shift toward a majority nuclear‑powered fleet. At the Rim of the Pacific 2026 exercise, the Navy demonstrated drones launched from attack boats to extend sensing range against undersea and surface targets, providing targeting data and acting as force multipliers that enhance stealth and efficiency for manned platforms. Defense contractors have also proposed cheaper autonomous torpedoes, additional underwater drones, smaller torpedoes, and next‑generation anti‑submarine mines to improve attack boat firepower and surveillance.

The United States is evaluating a permanent advisory detachment of special operations forces in Taiwan to strengthen its ability to deter a Chinese invasion and support a prolonged defense.

The United States has no treaty obligation to defend Taiwan, and its policy of strategic ambiguity leaves open the possibility of direct involvement. A Chinese invasion would require an amphibious landing across roughly one hundred miles of sea, a challenging operation for the People’s Liberation Army.

Detachment A, known officially as Detachment A, operated in Berlin from 1956 to 1990. It comprised fewer than 100 U.S. Army Special Forces operators serving two‑year assignments. The unit was organized into 12‑man teams tasked with activating anti‑communist networks, conducting sabotage, and gathering intelligence behind Soviet lines, according to the article.

U.S. special operations forces currently conduct short‑term rotational advisory missions in Taiwan, providing limited on‑island training and support. The United States publicly acknowledges arms sales and naval presence but does not disclose the scale or duration of advisory personnel.

The proposal calls for establishing a small, enduring advisory cadre modeled on Detachment A. Such a detachment would remain on the island for extended periods, integrate successive rotational teams, and deepen relationships with Taiwanese forces, according to the article. It would be anchored by special operations personnel and supported by other U.S. military elements.

Research cited in the article suggests that long‑term advisory work at the institutional level can improve partner readiness and create lasting effects. Effective advising requires consistency, adequate resources, and professional status for advisors, the research notes. Critics argue that a small detachment may be insufficient to harden Taiwan, but the article points out that paired with capable partners, limited footprints have produced measurable results in other regions.

If implemented, the detachment would aim to enable Taiwan to fight alone, with partners, or a combination, while preserving U.S. strategic flexibility. The proposal remains under discussion, and its outcome will depend on political decisions and Chinese reactions.