Vice Adm. Scott Gray will assume the newly established deputy chief of naval operations for sustainment on Oct. 5, inheriting responsibility for Navy shore installations, logistics and maintenance. The position was created to accelerate funding decisions and improve integration across the service’s staff. Gray, who relinquished command of Navy Installation Command during a change of ceremony at the Naval History Museum on Sept. 24, cited declining shore infrastructure as a growing risk to fleet readiness. He noted that deferred maintenance on piers, dry docks and barracks has compounded over decades, with some repairs now costing exponentially more than originally projected. Structural demands from newer equipment, such as heavier P-8 Poseidon aircraft, have further strained aging facilities. Gray described the situation as akin to a homeowner repeatedly postponing repairs until a small fix becomes a major expense. The Navy currently maintains Wi-Fi in 90 percent of barracks and has funded unaccompanied housing upgrades, including at Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton. Ongoing quality of life initiatives follow the 2022 suicide deaths of sailors assigned to USS George Washington and at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center. Gray plans to brief Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle on infrastructure challenges to support a multi-year funding strategy aimed at stabilizing the shore enterprise.
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North Korean special operations units have reportedly studied Russian battlefield methods during the Kursk campaign to refine infiltration techniques for potential use on the Korean Peninsula. The regime’s history of asymmetric tactics includes failed attempts such as the 1968 Blue House raid and the 1996 submarine infiltration near Gangneung, which ended in detection and withdrawal. Despite these setbacks, Pyongyang has continued to develop its special forces capabilities, particularly in maritime insertion and small-unit tactics.
Recent analysis suggests that North Korean troops participated in the Kursk fighting alongside Russian units, including the 11th Storm Corps, chosen for their experience in border operations near the DMZ. The terrain around Kursk, with its mix of farmland and forest, bears some resemblance to infiltration corridors in South Korea’s western border region. There, North Korean forces observed how Russian units used advanced camouflage, thermal protection gear, and drone reconnaissance to operate in technologically monitored environments.
Ukrainian military intelligence has noted that North Korean personnel deployed in Kursk were equipped with gear designed to reduce thermal signatures, including weather-resistant cloaks and modified uniforms. Open-source footage and Russian military reports indicate that these troops conducted reconnaissance and targeted supply lines, demonstrating proficiency in stealth movement and electronic avoidance. While direct evidence of drone strikes remains limited, Ukrainian sources confirm that North Korean drone operators have been trained in reconnaissance and artillery coordination.
The partnership between North Korea and Russia, formalized in mid-2024, has facilitated technology transfers, including drone designs and navigation systems. Russian state-linked sources have claimed that North Korean units are being trained in drone operations, with over 3,000 North Korean personnel reportedly serving as instructors in Russia by mid-2025. This exchange has focused on counter-drone measures, electronic warfare, and the use of fiber-optic guided drones that are harder to detect.
South Korea has responded by expanding its counter-drone capabilities, including acoustic sensors and integrated detection networks. However, analysts note that existing defenses are optimized for larger, more conventional drones and may not fully address the smaller, low-signature drones North Korea appears to be developing. The regime’s strategy appears to emphasize precision sabotage and targeted disruptions rather than large-scale attacks.
Experts caution that while North Korea’s current capabilities remain constrained by logistics and technical capacity, the transfer of battlefield experience from Ukraine creates a foundation for future operations. The regime may seek to exploit sympathizer networks, maritime routes, and tunnel systems to deliver equipment and operators. Any escalation would likely be calibrated to avoid full-scale conflict while testing the limits of South Korean and U.S. detection systems.
The evolving dynamic underscores a shift in North Korea’s approach: from large, high-risk infiltrations to more discreet, technology-enabled actions that blend into complex, drone-saturated environments. Whether these tactics will prove decisive remains uncertain, but the combination of foreign training, new hardware, and asymmetric doctrine presents a developing challenge for regional security planners.
Stars and Stripes will begin distributing printed newspapers to three U.S. military installations in Latvia and Lithuania starting October 1, adding physical copies to its overseas presence for the first time in the Baltic region.
The initial rollout delivers 270 copies per publication day across the sites: 100 each to Forward Operating Site Lielvarde and FOS Pabrade/Herkus in Lithuania, and 70 to FOS Adazi in Latvia. This expansion follows feedback from deployed personnel and military leadership about extending the newspaper’s reach beyond Poland, according to Lt. Col. Daniel Quinlan, commander of Stars and Stripes Europe and Expeditionary.
Quinlan emphasized the organization’s mission to provide trusted, independent news to service members wherever they are stationed. "When opportunities arise to expand our distribution network and increase support to deployed forces, we evaluate them carefully and act on them whenever feasible," he said. "Expanding into Latvia and Lithuania is another opportunity to ensure service members in forward locations have access to the same high-quality news and information available elsewhere across the theater."
The move comes as the Pentagon reviews Stars and Stripes’ distribution model, which has relied on print delivery since World War II. A recent modernization directive encourages greater digital access but does not set a timeline for ending print editions. Officials note that physical newspapers remain valuable in environments with limited or restricted internet connectivity, requiring no power or bandwidth to access.
Distribution will be managed directly by Stars and Stripes through contracted printers and logistics partners, with no routine delivery responsibilities assigned to installation personnel. Newspapers will be placed in branded racks at each site, ensuring consistent supply without added operational burdens.
First Lt. Elyse Montang, officer in charge of the 734th Regional Support Group’s Adazi mayor cell, described the arrival of physical newspapers as a "good morale boost" for troops. Word of the distribution has already generated interest across tenant units, with personnel anticipating regular access to the publication.
While no immediate plans exist to expand print distribution to Estonia or other eastern flank locations, Stars and Stripes has indicated it will continue assessing its network as U.S. force posture and operational needs evolve. "We remain committed to providing trusted news and information to service members where mission requirements take them," Quinlan said.
The expansion reflects ongoing efforts to adapt traditional media formats to modern military environments, balancing logistical efficiency with the enduring need for accessible, independent reporting in deployed settings.
Chinese naval and coast guard vessels intercepted a Philippine resupply operation near Second Thomas Shoal on Thursday, marking the first such interruption since a provisional understanding between Manila and Beijing was implemented in July 2024. The Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea stated that the People’s Liberation Army Navy and China Coast Guard conducted maneuvers that hindered the delivery of supplies to the grounded BRP Sierra Madre, a World War II-era landing ship serving as a Philippine outpost. Two Philippine Coast Guard patrol vessels, BRP Malabrigo and BRP Cabra, were supporting the resupply ship Lapu Lapu when Chinese forces approached. According to the task force, the interception involved dangerous maneuvers that risked collision and endangered Filipino personnel. The operation was suspended temporarily as a result. Philippine authorities reported that three Chinese warships, including two Type 022-class missile boats, participated alongside 11 additional coast guard and maritime militia vessels observed near Second Thomas and Sabina Shoals. A maritime monitoring map dated September 24, 2026, released by the Philippine Coast Guard, showed three cutters shadowing Cabra and Lapu Lapu. The incident occurred approximately 60 nautical miles from Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippine government characterized the action as obstructing a legitimate humanitarian and sustainment effort. Manila has maintained that the 2024 provisional agreement does not require prior Chinese approval for access to Second Thomas Shoal, a claim Beijing has not publicly confirmed. The encounter follows a series of escalating maritime interactions between Philippine and Chinese forces in the South China Sea, including a June 2024 clash that prompted the provisional arrangement. Earlier in July, Philippine and Chinese sailors engaged in a physical confrontation using batons and oars near the Sierra Madre. In the previous year, armed Chinese small boats had surrounded Second Thomas Shoal shortly after a fatal incident at Scarborough Shoal. The resupply mission coincided with a Philippine-led multinational maritime exercise near Scarborough Shoal, which included participation from ASEAN members and partners such as the United States, Australia, India, and Japan.
The U.S. Marine Corps has awarded Anduril Industries a $15,711,445.50 sole-source contract to supply Pulsar-L electronic warfare jammers for its Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV). The order, announced by Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) on April 7, follows a statement of intent issued last month. The Pulsar-L system, part of Anduril’s broader Pulsar family of counter-uncrewed aerial system (C-UAS) solutions, is designed to detect, track, and jam Group 1 and Group 2 drones operating up to 1,200 feet in altitude and 100 knots in speed for Group 1, and up to 3,500 feet and 250 knots for Group 2. These drone categories include small, often weaponized platforms such as kamikaze UASs currently deployed in Ukraine and other conflict zones.
The ACV program, intended to replace the Marine Corps’ aging Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs), includes three primary variants: the ACV-P personnel carrier, the ACV-C command-and-control version, and the ACV-30 equipped with a 30mm cannon turret. The service plans to acquire 389 ACV-Ps, 33 ACV-Cs, 152 ACV-30s, and 34 ACV-R armored recovery vehicles. As of April 2026, 150 baseline ACV-Ps and 21 ACV-Cs were in inventory. The Pulsar-L is intended to provide a mobile, integrated defense against drone threats without compromising the vehicle’s mobility, weight capacity, or power reserves.
According to the contract justification, the Pulsar-L is the only commercially available system capable of fulfilling the Marine Corps’ requirement for a lightweight, rapidly deployable C-UAS that can adapt to evolving threats. It employs machine learning to continuously adjust to new electromagnetic signatures without needing software updates from vendors. This capability is considered critical in environments where adversaries frequently modify drone communication patterns, a tactic observed in recent conflicts.
The urgency of the procurement has been linked to broader concerns about drone threats in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly following heightened tensions involving Iran and its use of weaponized UASs. While no direct operational connection has been confirmed, the timing coincides with U.S. military activities in the Middle East and growing investments in cognitive electronic warfare systems. The Marine Corps has emphasized that the lack of counter-drone capabilities on forward-deployed units poses a risk to mission success and force protection.
The Pulsar-L is already in use by U.S. Special Operations Command, where it has demonstrated effectiveness in engaging multiple drones simultaneously, both while stationary and in motion. Its integration into the ACV fleet is part of a larger initiative to develop layered defensive systems, including active protection systems and enhanced situational awareness tools. These efforts reflect a strategic shift toward equipping amphibious vehicles with organic, on-the-move defenses capable of countering increasingly sophisticated drone threats in contested littoral and land environments.
Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti, Sheikh Saleh al-Fawzan, issued a public statement on September 24 urging Yemeni government forces and Saudi troops stationed along the border to defe...
Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti, Sheikh Saleh al-Fawzan, issued a public statement on September 24 urging Yemeni government forces and Saudi troops stationed along the border to defend national territory and repel Houthi advances. The appeal, delivered as a religious directive, framed resistance to Houthi strikes as a duty for Saudi border units. Fawzan’s remarks followed a Houthi attack on a border outpost in al Tuwal, Jizan Province, several hours earlier, which may have prompted the timing of his address. He specifically instructed troops to “repel aggression” and “punish” those threatening Saudi land, referring to the Houthis by name.
International efforts to shield Saudi oil infrastructure have intensified since July, with France announcing on September 24 its deployment of personnel, radar systems, and defensive assets to Yanbu, a key Red Sea export terminal. This move aligns with broader U.S. and U.K. support for Saudi air defenses, aimed at countering repeated Houthi missile and drone strikes targeting oil facilities. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed responsibility for attacks on Yanbu’s refinery and unspecified Riyadh-area targets on September 25, continuing a campaign focused on economic infrastructure to pressure Saudi Arabia economically and politically.
The Houthi campaign seeks to compel concessions, including an end to Saudi support for Yemen’s internationally recognized government, withdrawal from Yemeni territory, compensation for war damages, and control over national energy resources. Meanwhile, Saudi-aligned forces retain control of the Taiz-Aden corridor, a critical supply route, despite ongoing Houthi attempts to disrupt it near Lahij Governorate. Iraqi authorities suspended Iranian flights to three domestic destinations on September 25, extending regional aviation restrictions tied to U.S. sanctions targeting Iran’s air sector. The United States has also threatened to halt Iraq’s oil revenue transfers if militias linked to Iran do not surrender weapons by September 30.
The situation reflects a broader escalation in regional defense postures, with external powers increasingly involved in safeguarding Saudi infrastructure while diplomatic and economic pressures mount on Iran and its allied groups.
The U.S. Navy released video showing a Blackbeard hypersonic missile attached to an F/A-18E/F Super Hornet during flight testing. The service aims to field the weapon in limited capacity by 2028, providing carrier air wings with a new standoff strike option against maritime targets. The missile is being developed by Castelion, a defense startup, under multiple contracts totaling tens of millions of dollars. A recent Pentagon award of $43.65 million covers production of 444 complete missile rounds for testing and evaluation. The system combines a booster stage with an upper glide vehicle, reaching speeds above Mach 5. Flight tests confirm the missile's compact size, allowing potential internal carriage on aircraft such as the F-35. The Navy emphasizes lower cost and scalable manufacturing as part of a broader effort to modernize munitions stockpiles. The program is part of the Multi-mission Affordable Capacity Effector initiative, with plans to procure 12,000 units over five years. Deployment timelines and force structure details remain under review.
Water service was restored at Camp Humphreys on Saturday, Sept. 26, 2026, after a multi-day outage that left residents without running water and prompted the Army to deploy emergency water tanks across the installation. The disruption, which began Friday evening, affected the largest U.S. overseas base and required crews to repressurize the system before residents could safely use plumbing. The Army confirmed the water was potable but noted an initial discoloration due to turbidity, urging users to run taps for 30 minutes to clear lines. Repairs were delayed by Chuseok, a major South Korean holiday, and the cause of the failure remained undisclosed. While some residents reported continued issues at specific locations, the garrison maintained that service was gradually returning. Camp Humphreys, home to U.S. Forces Korea and the 2nd Infantry Division, serves as a critical hub for American military operations in the region.
A U.S. Army signal specialist recently demonstrated wireless battlefield communication systems at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, aiming to reduce risks posed by enemy drone surveillance.
Spc. Juan Perez, a network communications specialist with the 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, helped establish connections between mobile communications hubs and Silvus radios during a validation exercise on September 24, 2026. The radios enabled data transmission between Tactical Communications Nodes up to half a mile apart, with intermediate units extending the range beyond three miles under optimal conditions.
The system allows soldiers to operate equipment remotely without maintaining physical cable links between command posts and field devices. In scenarios where thermal imaging drones detect heat signatures from equipment, this separation creates operational distance that may delay or complicate targeting, potentially serving as a tactical advantage.
Sgt. 1st Class Emmanuel Ramosnavedo, a signal operations specialist, noted that maintaining distance between operators and equipment could provide additional reaction time if a node is compromised. "We know we are already in scope of somebody close by," he said, referring to the likelihood of detection.
The 2nd Cavalry Regiment, the Army’s only forward-deployed Stryker brigade, is integrating this training into its standard curriculum. The goal is to expand the methodology across all squadrons by year’s end.
Spc. Johnny Castillo, a network communication systems specialist, emphasized that such exercises enhance tactical readiness and improve support capabilities for the unit’s overall mission. The initiative reflects broader efforts to modernize communication protocols in response to evolving battlefield threats, particularly unmanned aerial systems used for reconnaissance and targeting.
The former Cold War-era Pankstraße subway station in Berlin, converted into a nuclear fallout shelter in the 1970s, began offering guided public tours this week. The facility, designed to protect 3,339 people, features hermetically sealed steel doors, independent water and electricity supplies, and sleeping accommodations. Its reactivation coincides with heightened German interest in civil defense measures following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The shelter will remain accessible to visitors as part of ongoing efforts to educate the public about historical and contemporary security preparedness. Authorities emphasize the site's role in illustrating Germany's evolving approach to nuclear risk mitigation during a period of renewed geopolitical tension.
A combined task group of naval vessels from the Philippines, Japan, the United States, Singapore, India, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, and Malaysia conducted a Maritime Security Joint Cooperative Activity in the South China Sea from September 23 to 26, 2026. The exercise began with a shore phase in Subic Bay, Zambales, and moved to sea operations on Wednesday. Participating ships included the Philippine Navy’s landing platform dock BRP Tarlac (LD‑601), the Japan Maritime Self‑Defense Force’s helicopter destroyer JS Ise (DDH‑182), and the Philippine Navy’s frigate BRP Jose Rizal (FFG‑14). The United States contributed the littoral combat ship USS Canberra (LCS‑30) and a P‑8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Additional vessels from India, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia joined the formation.
During the operation, a People’s Liberation Army Navy warship reportedly shadowed the task group as it approached the designated exercise area, which lay approximately 45 nautical miles from Scarborough Shoal. The shadowing was observed by Philippine media outlet ABS‑CBN News. Separately, the Royal New Zealand Navy’s task group comprising the frigate HMNZS Te Mana and the fleet oiler HMNZS Aotearoa performed a replenishment‑at‑sea with the Royal Australian Navy destroyer HMAS Sydney (DDG‑42) while transiting the South China Sea.
The same week, the ADMM‑Plus Group launched Exercise Trident in Banten, Java, Indonesia. The exercise, running from September 22 to 26, involved 2,200 personnel from all 19 ADMM‑Plus member nations across seven distributed sites and at sea. Trident Resolve marked the largest ADMM‑Plus field training exercise in a decade, focusing on cyber security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and military medicine. Australia and Cambodia co‑led the cyber security working group, Singapore and New Zealand headed the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief group, and the United States and Indonesia led the military medicine group. Indonesia deployed its hospital ship KRI dr. Soeharso (990), while Singapore contributed the amphibious tank landing ship RSS Endeavour (210).
Other activities during the reporting period included a port visit by the Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey (P234) to Port Klang, Malaysia, on September 24, 2026, ahead of participation in the Five Power Defence Arrangement exercise Bersama Lima scheduled for October 12‑21. HMS Spey and its sister ship HMS Tamar have been forward deployed to the Indo‑Pacific since 2021. Also on September 24, the Italian Navy’s multi‑role combat ship ITS Giovanni delle Bande Nere (P434) docked in Laem Chabang, Thailand, concluding a deployment that included participation in Rim of the Pacific 2026 and Pacific Dragon 2026 exercises.
In Japan, the U.S. Navy fast‑attack submarine USS Scranton (SSN‑756) departed Yokosuka on September 22 after a two‑week port stay, as reported by local spotters. The following day, a U.S. Army HIMARS system assigned to the 1‑17 Long Range Fires Battalion fired during Exercise Orient Shield 26 at the Yausubetsu Training Area in Hokkaido. The multinational exercise, which concluded on September 26, involved U.S., Japanese, and Australian forces and featured a joint airborne operation, field training, and live‑fire demonstrations of HIMARS and multiple‑launch rocket systems.
Additionally, Russian naval vessels RFS Varyag (cruiser) and Marshal Krylov (missile range instrumentation ship) were sighted on September 23 sailing west of Rebun Island before transiting the La Pérouse Strait into the Sea of Okhotsk, where they were shadowed by a Japan Maritime Self‑Defense Force fast‑attack craft. On September 25, a Russian IL‑20 electronic intelligence aircraft flew over the Sea of Japan, prompting scramble of Japan Air Self‑Defense Force fighters in response.
Finally, the Royal Australian Navy’s fleet oiler HMAS Supply returned to Fleet Base East in Sydney on September 23 after a 101‑day deployment that visited Singapore, Japan, and the Philippines, during which it operated alongside U.S. and Philippine naval forces, demonstrating interoperability within the Indo‑Pacific logistics network.
Guam will require an estimated $11.7 billion in infrastructure and public services over the next 30 years to accommodate a growing U.S. military presence, Governor Lou Leon Guerrero said this week as she called for increased federal support.
The projected spending includes more than $415 million annually in additional government services by 2034, according to the governor’s office. Leon Guerrero described the island’s role in the planned military buildup as a national responsibility that demands shared resources.
During a meeting in San Francisco on Wednesday, the governor presented the findings to representatives from over 100 federal agencies involved in health care, utilities, education, cybersecurity and related sectors. The gathering was organized by the Defense Department’s Office of Local Defense Community Cooperation, which supports communities affected by military installations.
Leon Guerrero emphasized Guam’s unique constraints, noting its limited land area, aging infrastructure and reduced capacity to manage the scale of the expansion. She described the situation as unprecedented, stating it was prompting long‑standing local families to leave the island.
The buildup involves multiple installations, including Andersen Air Force Base, Marine Corps Camp Blaz and Naval Base Guam, which houses a submarine facility at Polaris Point. The military population is projected to rise from roughly 17,000 to 24,000 service members by fiscal 2033. Approximately 4,000 Marines are expected to relocate from Okinawa under a 2012 bilateral agreement, and an $8 billion Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense system will bring an additional 2,300 personnel and dependents by 2031.
Infrastructure challenges include bridges along the defense access highway that may not support heavier military convoys or cargo, and housing shortages. Guam currently has about 51,000 housing units, while the military community could exceed 45,000 people by 2034.
In response, the Defense Department announced in September 2025 plans to acquire or construct 2,400 housing units over a decade to accommodate the incoming personnel. Leon Guerrero urged the immediate convening of the federal Economic Adjustment Committee, which comprises representatives from 22 departments and agencies, to coordinate a unified response she termed “One Guam.”
“The federal government already has the authority, the programs, and the tools to act,” she said. “It is time to use them.”
A new assessment from the Washington think tank Defense Priorities argues that advances in precision weapons have simultaneously revealed weaknesses in U.S. military installations across the Middle East and reduced the strategic value of those sites.
The report notes that during the 2026 Iran conflict, the United States expended roughly two‑thirds of its Patriot interceptor inventory defending bases, a deployment that prompted a replacement cost estimate of $10 billion to $20 billion. It also cites a separate analysis indicating that long‑range bombers operating from the United States and Britain, carrier‑based aircraft, and missiles launched from ships were sufficient to deliver most of the firepower required in that war.
According to Benjamin Friedman, policy director at Defense Priorities, the accuracy of U.S. missiles and aircraft makes bases in the Middle East less necessary, while the same precision makes them more vulnerable to attack. Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted the U.S. network of installations, damaging aircraft, radars, communications equipment and infrastructure such as the Navy’s main regional logistics hub in Bahrain. A Pentagon inspector general report released this month confirmed that hundreds of buildings and structures across the region were damaged or destroyed.
The analysis highlights a dilemma for U.S. planners: damaged bases may no longer serve the same critical role in projecting power, yet they continue to reassure allies and enable rapid crisis response. Retired General David Petraeus, former head of U.S. Central Command, recently echoed the conclusion that bases around the Persian Gulf are no longer viable.
Defense Priorities suggests that a more Navy‑focused approach — relying on carrier strike groups and long‑range missile launches — could reduce exposure to missile and drone attacks while preserving combat capability. However, the report acknowledges limits to this model, noting strain on the carrier fleet and the continued need for forward‑deployed air‑refueling assets.
The vulnerability of overseas bases is described as part of a broader trend in which smaller powers can increasingly contest U.S. military hegemony. The Pentagon has not yet decided which damaged facilities to rebuild or how its future presence in the Middle East will be structured, and the report warns that future adversaries may field even more cost‑effective missile and drone stockpiles.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, from September 22 to 24, 2026. The two sides agreed to extend their trade truce by two months beyond the prior November 10 expiration date, with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent confirming the PRC’s continued purchases of American soybeans while noting incomplete commitments on other agricultural goods. Xi emphasized AI security cooperation, calling for development of the technology to remain “under human control” and citing shared interests between the nations. He also announced plans to welcome 100,000 American students to China over five years and to send two new pandas to the United States, continuing a tradition of panda diplomacy. During the summit, Xi referenced the “Thucydides trap,” urging bilateral cooperation to reduce conflict risks, and described the US-PRC relationship as “constructive and stable.” He accepted an invitation to attend an APEC meeting in the PRC in November. In a dinner address, Xi linked Trump’s “Make America Great Again” movement to China’s pursuit of national rejuvenation, suggesting complementary goals. The PRC used the summit to signal a more conciliatory tone on certain issues, including new regulations requiring permits to export two precursor chemicals used in fentanyl production to the US, Mexico, and Canada. These measures supplement earlier 2025 legislation aimed at addressing US concerns over synthetic drug trafficking. Xi directly urged Trump to “oppose Taiwan independence,” marking a shift in phrasing from the PRC’s usual warning against “supporting” such moves. US officials have not altered their Taiwan policy, though a proposed $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan has faced delays attributed to supply chain constraints. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio cited these constraints when questioned about delivery timelines. The US Congress continues to back arms sales to Taiwan under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which guarantees defensive capabilities. Four Republican senators recently urged Trump to release Taiwan’s security funding. Meanwhile, Taiwanese Labor Minister Hung Sun-han attended the APEC forum in Nanjing as part of a delegation representing “Chinese Taipei,” marking his first official visit to the PRC under the current administration. His participation reaffirmed Taiwan’s long-standing, though limited, engagement in the forum without signaling a shift in cross-Strait relations. The PRC has not changed its stance on Taiwan’s APEC status, which remains under the name “Chinese Taipei” since 1991. In a separate development, former US Army soldier Ruoyu Duan pleaded guilty on September 16, 2026, to conspiring to spy for the PRC, admitting to recruiting two active-duty soldiers to obtain classified information on US military systems, including details on HIMARS rocket launchers and other equipment relevant to potential operations in the Taiwan Strait. The stolen data, gathered between 2021 and 2025, also included encrypted storage devices. US authorities had arrested the three individuals in March 2025. The case reflects broader PRC efforts to acquire military and technological intelligence, particularly regarding systems used by US and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific. Such intelligence could inform PLA strategies and identify vulnerabilities in US intervention scenarios involving Taiwan. Taiwan has indicated plans to deploy HIMARS systems on outlying islands to enhance its defensive reach. The Philippines has shown growing defense ties with Taiwan, including the transfer of a decommissioned 500-ton patrol vessel from Taiwan’s Coast Guard to the Philippine Coast Guard. Taiwan also announced plans to open a new representative office in Cebu, its second in the country. These moves occur despite the Philippines’ formal recognition of the PRC since 1975. The PRC has criticized both developments, stating they violate the one-China principle. The Philippines and Taiwan share concerns over PRC maritime activity in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, where the Coast Guard and Navy frequently conduct operations near disputed zones. Enhanced coordination between their coast guards could improve responses to such incursions. The PRC has expressed particular concern over strengthening ties within what it calls the “first island chain,” viewing them as challenges to its regional ambitions. While the recent US-PRC summit emphasized cooperation, the shift in rhetoric on Taiwan suggests Beijing may seek to leverage improved relations to influence Washington’s stance, even as concrete policy changes remain absent.
Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs announced during a U.S. visit that his government is pursuing the purchase of Anduril Industries' Barracuda family of long-range strike missiles, marking the first such acquisition by a Baltic state. The announcement came alongside the signing of cooperation memoranda between Latvia’s Ministry of Defence, Anduril, and Origin Robotics, a Latvian technology firm. Rinkēvičs described the move as part of broader defense-industry collaboration between Latvia and the United States, emphasizing the country’s intent to complete the Barracuda missile acquisition. The specific variant, quantity, delivery timeline, and financial terms of the potential deal were not disclosed. The Barracuda system includes multiple variants, with the surface-launched SLB-500M capable of traveling over 500 nautical miles at speeds between 190 and 500 knots. It can be launched from ground platforms, though Latvia currently operates only a limited number of utility aircraft and helicopters. The missile’s U.S. military designation is AGM-189A when air-launched. Latvia already plans to integrate the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) onto its M142 HIMARS launchers, which are scheduled for deployment in 2027 and have a maximum range of approximately 186 miles. The country’s interest in Barracuda aligns with a wider European effort to expand deep precision strike capabilities. Several NATO members, including France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, are advancing programs that combine indigenous development with foreign procurement to field ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. Poland, for example, is developing a layered strike architecture that integrates air-launched and ground-launched systems, with ambitions for weapons capable of reaching up to 3,000 kilometers. Polish officials have also indicated plans to increase domestic production content of such systems over time. Latvia’s potential Barracuda purchase reflects a shift toward mobile, ground-launched weapons that can strike targets at distance without requiring air superiority over the launch zone. This approach is particularly relevant for NATO’s eastern flank, where dispersed launch platforms enhance survivability and reduce reliance on vulnerable air assets. The deterioration of Europe’s security environment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, along with the 2019 termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, has accelerated interest in long-range conventional strike systems. Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons has demonstrated both the strategic value and operational necessity of such capabilities, prompting European nations to prioritize stockpiling precision munitions. Anduril has positioned the Barracuda family as a cost-effective, producible alternative to more expensive U.S. cruise missiles. A prototype of the surface-launched Barracuda-500M successfully tested its launcher, missile, and booster components in 2025. The company has emphasized scalability and affordability as key advantages. In July 2026, Anduril entered a strategic agreement with Poland’s Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr 2 (WZL-2) to establish production of the Barracuda-500M in Bydgoszcz, marking the first European country to do so. Polish state-owned defence group Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa noted that the program aims to gradually increase local content and incorporate European software solutions. Latvia has not indicated whether any production or integration of the Barracuda system will occur domestically, though its Investment and Development Agency is exploring joint development, testing, and manufacturing opportunities with U.S. partners. Origin Robotics is among the Latvian firms participating in this effort. The broader Latvian delegation includes companies specializing in unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and sensor technologies. While details remain limited, the development underscores a growing convergence across NATO’s eastern members on the need for mobile, long-range strike capabilities as a complement to existing air- and sea-based assets. This trend reflects a strategic recalibration in response to evolving threats and the demand for resilient, scalable deterrence options across the alliance.