LayerZero Labs introduced Aerie, a research system designed to aggregate thousands of quantum-resistant Falcon signatures rapidly. In benchmarks using an Apple M4 Max laptop with 16 worker threads, Aerie processed 32,768 Falcon-512 signatures in 0.65 seconds, achieving a peak memory usage of 2.1 GiB. A related test with 16,384 Falcon-1024 signatures completed in 0.63 seconds under comparable conditions. The system generates proofs faster than leanVM for Falcon-based workloads, though leanVM verified proofs more quickly in single-threaded scenarios. Aerie’s approach combines signature data into a single proof without recursion, eliminating intermediate steps and allowing alternative nodes to generate replacement proofs if needed. The aggregate size for 32,768 Falcon-512 signatures was reported at 1,346 KiB, including salts and headers, with the proof component occupying approximately 66 KiB. This represents about 42.1 bytes per signature, roughly 16 times smaller than the padded Falcon signatures it replaces. A shared salt variant could reduce the total to around 66 KiB, though the researchers noted this estimate relies on specific signing policies and security assumptions not yet validated. Compared to Orthus, an earlier Falcon aggregation system, Aerie demonstrated 1.5 times faster proof generation, 38 times faster verification, and proofs 1.7 times smaller, though Orthus omitted certain signature-format checks performed by Aerie. The system was benchmarked against leanVM, part of Ethereum’s hash-based aggregation efforts, where Aerie’s Falcon-512 proving throughput reached 29 times leanVM’s XMSS throughput under similar conditions. Verification times differed, with leanVM completing in 5.9 to 6.5 milliseconds per proof on one thread, while Aerie required 54 milliseconds for its 32,768-signature batch on a single thread. Aerie retains per-signature salts to enable direct hash calculations, delegating remaining mathematical checks to the Akita cryptographic framework. The paper frames the work as addressing a challenge in proof-of-stake blockchains, where validators sign messages confirming network state, requiring participants to verify these signatures efficiently. Ethereum currently uses BLS signatures to aggregate roughly 32,000 validator votes into a compact signature, but BLS lacks resistance to quantum attacks. Post-quantum alternatives under consideration by U.S. standards bodies lack comparable aggregation features. NIST lists Falcon as part of ongoing standardization efforts, distinct from its finalized ML-DSA and SLH-DSA standards, which were completed in August 2024. The organization recommends migrating systems vulnerable to quantum attacks, with 2035 cited as a target date for phasing out quantum-susceptible algorithms, earlier for high-risk applications. LayerZero noted ML-DSA aggregation functions within Aerie but indicated performance metrics and implementation specifics remain under development. The project involved contributors from LayerZero Labs, a16z crypto research, Carnegie Mellon University, and Imperial College London, building on the Akita proof system. An August draft from the Ethereum Foundation explored post-quantum-ready deposit contracts with mechanisms to retire BLS deposits, though the proposal remains under technical review with unresolved feedback. The Foundation’s September 7 priorities document set a December 2029 target for quantum resistance across execution, consensus, and data layers, treating a 2030 quantum threat as a deliberately aggressive scenario to be reassessed in early 2027 with input from external experts.