U.S. President Donald Trump announced on August 1 that he canceled planned military strikes against Iran after Iranian negotiators and regional states reported agreement on a deal to open the Strait of Hormuz and end Iran’s nuclear threat.

The Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project issued a daily update covering the previous 24 hours, noting that Iran used the recent de‑escalation to import equipment, repair systems and develop new drones, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains a dominant force in Tehran’s decision‑making.

U.S. and Iranian officials said the proposed arrangement would allow vessels to enter the Persian Gulf through Iranian waters and exit through Omani waters, giving Iran control over inbound traffic and potentially restricting which ships can navigate the waterway.

Iranian officials stated they seek to prevent hostile vessels, including U.S. Navy ships, from entering the Persian Gulf; Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said he accepted a U.S.-Qatari proposal, and Wall Street Journal reported that Qatari mediators presented a new plan that Iran responded to positively.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps faction led by Commander Ahmad Vahidi is expected to reject any arrangement that reduces Iranian control over the strait, and IRGC‑affiliated Fars News denied that Iran agreed to reopen the strait, saying the strait will remain closed while the United States conducts hostile actions and that transit requires IRGC Navy permission.

ISW‑CTP analysts said Iran’s war aims include securing international recognition of its control over the Strait of Hormuz, degrading the United States’ ability and willingness to continue the war, restoring deterrence, and dividing the United States from Israel and Arab states.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian cited economic benefits of the memorandum of understanding in June when urging Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to accept it, and some officials said the pause in U.S. military operations enables Iran to reconstitute its military capabilities and import new equipment.

The arrangement remains contingent on IRGC approval and the willingness of the United States to refrain from further strikes, leaving the future of the Strait of Hormuz unresolved.

Iran threatened to strike regional energy infrastructure to deter U.S. and Israeli attacks, a strategy it has used to increase the costs of a renewed conflict. On August 1, Kuwaiti air defenses intercepted several Iranian drones targeting a government building in northern Kuwait and a vehicle on Bubiyan Island, a site that hosts U.S. anti‑aircraft equipment. Iran has not claimed responsibility for the attack. Senior IRGC officers told The New York Times that during the April 2026 U.S.–Iran ceasefire they held virtual conference calls with Hezbollah, Houthi and Iraqi militia commanders to coordinate expanded operations and raise the financial and military costs for U.S. forces. The officers said the outreach was intended to make the war more costly for President Donald Trump and to weaken U.S. resolve. Iranian media, including IRGC‑affiliated Tasnim and Fars news agencies, circulated a list of oil fields and other energy facilities in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates that Tehran says its missiles can reach. ISW‑CTP analysts have observed reports consistent with these claims. Eight Iraqi sources told Reuters that the IRGC established covert cells in Iraq to conduct attacks on Gulf states that host U.S. forces during the ceasefire. The same officers added that Quds Force commanders worked directly with the proxy groups on the ground. In addition, Iranian‑backed militias carried out multiple attacks on Gulf countries in March and April, including strikes on Kuwait’s Abdali border crossing with Iraq on July 23. Iranian attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz aim to impose economic pressure on the global economy and erode U.S. willingness to continue the war, according to the Supreme National Security Council, which warned that greater Iranian control of the strait would be paid for by U.S. citizens and the energy sector. The council also said Iran will strengthen its control over the strait in response to a U.S. blockade of Iranian ports. UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that a projectile struck the Bermuda‑flagged GASLOG SHANGHAI oil tanker 11 nautical miles northeast of Limah, Oman, damaging its engine room but causing no casualties. Another projectile landed near a second vessel 21 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Oman, with no damage or casualties. Iran continues to assert illegal control over the Strait of Hormuz by attacking civilian vessels that use non‑Iranian‑approved routes, such as the southern Omani route, which undermines its claim of full control. The Houthi movement denied on August 1 that it is imposing fees on international commercial vessels transiting the Bab al Mandeb Strait, despite regional sources suggesting it may do so to pressure Saudi Arabia. United Kingdom officials reiterated that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to all vessel traffic. The situation remains unresolved as Iran continues to threaten regional infrastructure and as the United States maintains its stance on the strait’s accessibility.

Russian forces conducted a large‑scale missile and drone attack on Ukraine overnight on July 29–30, launching 284 Shahed‑type, Gerbera‑type and Italmas‑type drones and 74 missiles from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, Kursk and other oblasts. Ukrainian Air Force reported that 54 cruise missiles, 265 drones and one ballistic missile were intercepted; 20 locations were hit and debris fell at 13 locations. The assault targeted Kyiv, Lviv and other oblasts, striking residential, educational, port and civilian infrastructure and resulting in at least eight deaths and dozens of injuries, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The attack formed part of a strategy to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors. Russian forces have increased the proportion of missiles and decreased the number of drones in recent strike packages, a shift highlighted by a milblogger on July 30. The use of a North Korean‑provided KN‑23 ballistic missile marked the first deployment of that type since summer 2025. A Kh‑101 cruise missile is believed to have crashed in eastern Poland near Tarnawa‑Kolonia, though Polish officials said the missile was not aimed at Polish territory.

Ukrainian officials reported that residential buildings were hit in multiple oblasts, including a strike in Radushne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that destroyed a house and killed two parents and four children. Zelensky said at least eight people died and dozens were injured. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the missile that entered Polish airspace was likely a Russian Kh‑101 and fell in a field, with no indication it was intended for Poland. NATO airspace has been violated by Russian drones previously; this was the first instance of a Russian missile crossing into NATO territory.

Ukrainian forces continued strikes against Wildberries warehouses in Russia and occupied territories, hitting facilities in Penza Oblast and the Republic of Udmurt on the night of July 29–30. Local officials reported that about 1,500 sellers in Leningrad Oblast lost goods in fires caused by the strikes. Russian officials arranged a meeting to discuss support for affected small and medium‑size businesses.

Ukrainian Commander‑in‑Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi replaced several senior officers, including the chief of staff of the Land Forces and the commander of Logistics Forces, and terminated the secondment of the Missile Forces commander to the General Staff. The Ministry of Defense and the Cabinet of Ministers appointed new deputy ministers for human capital and European integration, and named former Economy Minister Oleksiy Sobolev as deputy head of the presidential office.

Ukrainian forces also struck Russian port infrastructure and oil facilities, with satellite and thermal data showing damage to over 30 % of Russian refining capacity. Strikes on the port of Taman in Krasnodar Krai caused fires and heat anomalies detected by NASA. Russian forces continued limited offensives in Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, claiming seizure of several settlements, while independent sources contested those claims.

Analysts note that Russia’s ability to sustain extensive air defense coverage is uncertain, and NATO may need to consider formal air defense cooperation with Ukraine.

On June 22, the United States announced that it had signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. The agreement authorizes trade in nuclear technology, equipment, and materials under conditions set out in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. The terms require the partner to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, maintain physical security of transferred material, obtain U.S. consent before retransferring nuclear material, and secure U.S. approval before enriching, reprocessing, or transferring U.S.-provided material.

The agreement includes provisions that could permit Saudi Arabia to pursue uranium enrichment and allows the kingdom to decline enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Two accompanying arrangements are reported: a study of the economic feasibility of enrichment and the use of black‑box technology to shield details of nuclear facilities while providing fuel for energy production. Inspections will be conducted by the United States, while Saudi Arabia will forgo the Additional Protocol required under the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty.

The deal has drawn scrutiny from non‑proliferation experts and congressional oversight committees. Concerns have been raised that reduced inspection requirements and potential enrichment capabilities may increase proliferation risks. The United States previously required the Additional Protocol and a ban on enrichment as conditions for similar agreements, such as the 2009 pact with the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia’s long‑standing refusal to accept the Additional Protocol dates back two decades.

If the joint feasibility study concludes that enrichment is not economically viable, Saudi Arabia may forgo enrichment for ten years. After that period, the kingdom could resume enrichment activities under U.S. approval. The arrangement also permits the transfer of reactor components and other technology through black‑boxed procedures.

Congress is expected to review the agreement and may seek amendments to address inspection and enrichment provisions. Officials have noted that normalization of Saudi relations with Israel could influence the agreement’s trajectory.

President Donald Trump announced on Saturday that he is holding off on new U.S. strikes against Iran after Tehran indicated progress toward an agreement that could reopen the Strait of Hormuz. He said he would cancel the attack pending a deal, according to a post on his Truth Social account.

U.S. tensions have escalated over the past six months, with Iranian attacks on American allies and a de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz that has driven sharp swings in global energy prices.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman urged Trump to refrain from new strikes, and Israeli official Zev Elkin expressed doubt that the diplomatic vector would become a full agreement, according to statements to local media.

Discussions between Iran and Oman last month aimed to reopen the Hormuz Strait, while Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned the United States against adventurous military actions and said Iran remains prepared to respond decisively.

The United States and Iran paused hostilities in late July after a brief truce, but Iran launched multiple ballistic missile attacks on a U.S. base in Jordan on Tuesday night, prompting Trump's announcement.

Brent crude traded above $90 per barrel last week, up from below $72 at the start of July, as OPEC+ nations agreed in principle to a modest production increase for September.

U.S. embassies across the region warned Americans to expect possible flight cancellations, airspace closures and other travel disruptions while tensions remain high.

The situation remains unresolved, with no confirmed agreement between Iran and the United States and continued uncertainty over the future of the Hormuz Strait.

An improvised explosive device detonated on August 1 in a restaurant in central Moscow, killing a woman who carried the bomb, a security guard and a patron, and injuring 21 people; Russian officials said the blast may have targeted Russian Aerospace Forces commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko, who was celebrating his birthday at the venue, though his condition remains unconfirmed. Multiple Russian sources cited by Baza, Kommersant and other outlets suggested the explosion was an assassination attempt and that Chayko’s daughter may have been injured, while other sources reported that security personnel from the Federal Protective Service were present but off duty. Chayko has served as commander of the Russian Air Force since May 2026, after previous posts as commander of the Eastern Military District and the Russian Force Grouping in Syria, and has been linked to actions in Ukraine including the Bucha killings.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes on Russian territory during the same period. They hit the Saratov Oil Refinery, which has an annual capacity of about seven million tons, the Bashneft Oil Refinery in Ufa, the Lyudinovskaya oil depot in Kaluga Oblast and the Omsk Oil Refinery near Omsk, according to Ukrainian officials and geolocated footage. Ukrainian forces also struck the Engels‑2 strategic bomber base near Saratov, a Wildberries warehouse in Samara Oblast, and multiple air‑defence radar sites in Krasnodar Krai, including Kasta‑2E2 and Nebo‑S stations, as reported by the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces.

Russian forces launched 133 drones and a mix of loitering munitions and glide bombs against Ukraine overnight and during the day on August 2, downing 109 of them and causing debris to fall at three locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes hit civilian and commercial infrastructure in several oblasts. Ukrainian retailers reported a second warehouse strike by Shahed‑type drones in Kyiv Oblast. Russian statements described damage as resulting from falling debris rather than Ukrainian attacks.

Ukrainian strikes also targeted Russian energy assets in occupied territories, destroying five electrical substations and a combined heat and power plant in Mariupol, striking power nodes in Crimea, and damaging rail bridges and port facilities in the Black Sea region, including Odesa. Russian officials said 80 percent of recent port strikes involved Banderol loitering munitions, which they described as filling the gap between cheaper Shahed drones and more precise cruise missiles. Open‑source analysts noted that Russian glide bombs have begun using extended‑range kits that increase their reach beyond 100 kilometers.

In the northern front, Russian forces carried out limited offensives in Sumy Oblast without advancing, while Ukrainian forces struck drone control points near Olkhozhemchugov in Kursk and near Navlya in Bryansk. Russian glide bomb attacks hit Kovpakiv Raion in Sumy, damaging infrastructure. In eastern Ukraine, Russian units intensified FPV drone strikes on Kharkiv, with the mayor reporting 51 FPV strikes in July, and continued limited offensives in the Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk and Borova sectors. In Donetsk Oblast, Russian forces used FAB‑250 glide bombs on Slovyansk and conducted multiple KAB‑250 strikes on Druzhkivka, resulting in civilian casualties.

A Kremlin‑affiliated milblogger noted that Ukraine’s long‑range strikes have continued for a second month, raising concerns among Russian commentators about the adequacy of Russian air‑defence responses. Belarus announced the formation of a new 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade near Gomel, about 40 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, as part of efforts to integrate its forces more closely with Russian structures.

The assessment concludes without confirming Chayko’s status or the overall impact of the Moscow incident, and notes that Ukrainian operations continue to target Russian rear‑area infrastructure while Russian forces maintain limited ground advances across multiple fronts.

The U.S. Navy announced plans for a new family of modular surface‑to‑air missiles called the Naval Modular Missile (NMM), as described in a draft request for solutions notice. The program seeks to replace existing Standard missiles with a common interceptor design. According to the draft notice, the Navy envisions at least four All‑Up‑Round variants, including a long‑range version that fits in a Mk 41 VLS cell using a 21‑inch rocket motor similar to existing SM‑3 Block IIA and SM‑6 Block IB missiles. Slimmer extended and medium‑range versions, designated DP‑ER and QP‑MR, could be dual‑ or quad‑packed into a single VLS cell. A submarine‑launched version, called ER‑S, would be loaded into the Virginia Payload Module on Block V Virginia‑class boats via a multiple‑all‑up‑round canister adapter. The Navy has not fielded any operational submarine‑launched anti‑air missile capability to date. The program is budgeted at $311 million for fiscal year 2027 as a new start effort, with a production target of 1,000 interceptors per year within five years after contract award, according to the budget request. Multiple vendors are expected to produce the modular components to promote competition and cost savings. The Navy says the new system will increase magazine depth, allowing more engagements before resupply and providing greater flexibility for forward deployment. The draft notice also highlights that the interceptor is described as highly agile and multi‑mission capable, with potential hypersonic speeds. Challenges remain, however, because firing a large interceptor from a submarine generates a significant infrared, radar, and acoustic signature, and mitigation strategies are not yet defined. The Navy’s 2027 budget request notes that the capability could help the service keep pace with advancing anti‑access/area‑denial threats from supersonic and hypersonic missiles fielded by potential adversaries. Development of the NMM will continue to be evaluated as the Navy refines requirements and acquisition strategies.

From July 22 to July 31, 2026, naval movements and exercises were reported in the Western Pacific. On July 22, the Nimitz‑class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN‑71) led a group sail off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2026. The exercise involved more than 30,000 personnel from 30 nations, 31 surface ships, five submarines and more than 190 aircraft, conducting 500 maritime drills, 2,400 flight sorties and responding to over 5,000 scenario‑based problem sets, and concluded on Friday. On July 27, the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA‑7) and the dock landing ship USS Rushmore (LSD‑47) returned to their homeport in Sasebo, Japan, after a six‑month patrol in the 5th and 7th Fleet areas. The ships had previously off‑loaded elements of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit in Okinawa. On July 30, the People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted naval and air combat readiness patrols around Scarborough Shoal, including the Type 054B frigate CNS Qinzhou (555), the frigate CNS Tongliao (554), and aircraft such as H‑6 bombers, J‑16 fighters, Y‑9 MPA and JL‑10 light combat aircraft. A JL‑10 aircraft was reported to have tracked a Philippine Air Force NC‑212i light transport. Also on July 30, PLAN frigate CNS Yancheng (546) and cruiser CNS Nanchang (101) were observed in the Miyako Strait, escorted by a JMSDF P‑1 maritime patrol aircraft and a JMSDF P‑3C Orion MPA. On July 29, a Russian‑Chinese joint surface action group arrived in Vladivostok, comprising the Russian corvette RFS Rezkiy (343), the Chinese cruiser CNS Anshan (103), the destroyer CNS Kaifeng (124) and the oiler CNS Kekexilihu (903). The group concluded a 160‑day deployment that began in early May, during which Rezkiy sailed more than 27,000 nautical miles. The patrol included shipboard helicopter landings, counter‑terrorism operations, humanitarian assistance and live‑fire drills, including machine‑gun fire in Japan’s exclusive economic zone on July 19. On July 25, the mine countermeasures ship USS Chief (MCM‑14) arrived in Niigata, Japan, for a scheduled port visit. On July 30, the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN‑73) and its strike group entered Da Nang, Vietnam, marking the first carrier strike group visit since 2023. The group includes the carrier, Carrier Air Wing 5, cruiser USS Robert Smalls (CG‑62) and destroyer USS Shoup (DDG‑86); the destroyer USS Benfold (DDG‑65) remains deployed in the South China Sea. On July 29, Russian submarine RFS Ufa (B‑588) and submarine rescue ship Igor Belousov completed a four‑day port visit to Cam Ranh, Vietnam. On July 29, the Virginia‑class attack submarine USS Minnesota (SSN‑783) returned to its homeport at Naval Base Guam, completing its inaugural forward‑deployed deployment. The submarine participated in the multinational exercise Valiant Shield 2026 and made port visits to Okinawa and Sasebo, Japan. On July 24, Malaysian Army soldiers boarded a U.S. Army UH‑60 Black Hawk helicopter during Exercise Keris Strike 26 near Kota Belud, Malaysia. The exercise involved the Malaysian Army, U.S. Army, Australian Army and other national guard units, and was supported by Black Hawk helicopters, HIMARS and Tiger attack helicopters. On July 29, the Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Perth (FFH157) docked in Port Klang, Malaysia, for a rest and replenishment stop before proceeding to Thailand. On July 28, the U.S. Navy‑led Pacific Partnership 2026 humanitarian and civic assistance mission completed its first stop in Sibolga, Indonesia, with HMAS Choules (L100) serving as the host ship. On July 27, U.S. Marines with Marine Rotational Force – Darwin 26, Australian Army soldiers and Armed Forces of the Philippines personnel conducted a live‑fire drill with an MK‑19 40 mm grenade launcher during Exercise Predator’s Run 26 in Townsville, Australia. Exercise Pitch Black 2026, running from July 20 to August 7, involved aircraft from the United States, Japan, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, India, Singapore, Germany, France, Spain and several other nations, with up to 100 jet aircraft and more than 2,500 personnel operating from bases in the Northern Territory and Queensland.

Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories and the University of California, Berkeley used the wargame Tantalus to examine how deterrence influences cyber attack decisions. The study created a scenario in which one player threatened another with a nuclear response if a critical infrastructure attack were launched. Participants selected an initial action, received a deterrent threat, and could revise their plan before execution. Across 394 games involving 1,090 players, the team observed instances where a planned cyber operation was abandoned after a deterrent threat was presented. The findings indicate that cyber threats were as effective as kinetic threats in prompting a change of course, though players used deterrent threats less frequently against cyber operations than against conventional attacks. The authors note that while cyber operations can be deterred, states appear reluctant to employ deterrence signals, possibly because they view cyberspace primarily as an intelligence domain. The methodology demonstrates that wargaming can reveal decision‑making moments that are otherwise unobservable in real‑world security contexts. The authors recommend greater attention to deterrence within cyber strategy, emphasizing that undisclosed threats cannot affect an adversary’s calculus.

A U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II crashed near Marine Corps Air Station Miramar in California on June 20, 2026, after the pilot ejected during routine training operations.

The aircraft, assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, was conducting carrier qualification and integrated training missions off the California coast.

A Marine Corps spokesperson confirmed the mishap to USNI News, stating that the pilot was recovered and transported to a medical facility. Video posted on the social media platform X captured black smoke rising from the aircraft.

The Marine Corps said further details would be released as they become available, and the incident highlights ongoing safety considerations in military aviation training.

USS Georgia (SSGN-729) returned to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Ga., on Monday after completing its final deployment, the Navy announced.

The vessel participated in U.S. strikes on Iran during Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Epic Fury, according to the Navy. Georgia is part of a class that includes USS Ohio (SSGN-726), USS Michigan (SSGN-727) and USS Florida (SSGN-728), which were retrofitted between 2002 and 2007 and have supported operations in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

The Navy plans to replace the Ohio‑class capability with Block V and Block VI Virginia‑class attack submarines equipped with the Virginia Payload Module, each carrying 42 Tomahawk missiles. In July, the service awarded contracts for nine Block VI vessels to General Dynamics Electric Boat and HII Newport News Shipbuilding. The first Virginia‑class boat with the VPM, USS Arizona (SSN‑8030), is expected to enter service in 2028.

Also this week, the Freedom‑class littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS‑3) was decommissioned at Naval Base San Diego, Calif., on Wednesday. Commissioned in 2012 as part of the initial Freedom‑class contract with Lockheed Martin, Fort Worth served as an operational test platform. A Navy statement noted that the ship and its crew contributed to defining the capabilities and deployment of the current LCS platform. The first Freedom‑class vessel, LCS‑1, was decommissioned in 2021.